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THE PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC PRESSURE BY
SECTION 7 OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
Jurrius G. GETMAN t
INTRODUCTION
One of the central purposes of the Wagner Act ' was to counter-
balance the power of employers by facilitating the use of strikes and
other forms of economic pressure by employees.' To this end section 7
of the act granted to employees the right to engage in concerted
activity for mutual aid or protection,3 while section 8 limited the
ability of employers to respond.' Although there have been many
tProfessor of Law, Indiana University. B.A. 1953, C.C.N.Y. LL.B. 1958,
LL.M. 1963, Harvard University. Member, District of Columbia Bar.
I would like to thank my colleagues, A. A. Fatouros and Dan Hopson, Jr., for
their help in reading the manuscript prior to publication. This article is considerably
improved as a result of their criticism.
I National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§151-68 (1964).
2 "The Wagner Act became law on the floodtide of belief that the conflicting
interests of management and worker can be adjusted only by private negotiations,
backed, if necessary, by economic weapons, without the intervention of law." Cox,
The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 322 (1951) [herein-
after cited as Cox]. See H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); 78
CONG. REc. 3443 (1934) (remarks of Senator Wagner).
8 Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
National Labor Relations Act § 7, as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1964).
4 It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization ....
National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a) (1), (3), added by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (3) (1964).
(1195)
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changes made in the NLRA since 1935, the use of economic pressure
by employees remains a highly significant factor in the scheme of
labor relations contemplated by the act.
The right to utilize economic pressure was included in section 7
in order to prohibit employers from using participation in such activity
as grounds for disciplinary action.5 It was not intended, however, that
an employer be required to yield to his employees' demands. The
scheme of the act contemplates that an employer may resist employee
pressure and subject the union to a test of economic power. A natural
tension exists between the policy forbidding an employer to discipline
employees for using economic pressure and the policy permitting him
to defend his own economic interests. The National Labor Relations
Board and the courts are often required to characterize particular em-
ployer responses as unfair labor practices or as legitimate steps to
resist union pressure. The line between these concepts is vague;
accordingly, the extent to which sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) limit
employer responses to economic pressure has been a source of continual
difficulty in the enforcement of the act.'
Another source of difficulty arises from the fact that the statutory
scheme does not recognize economic pressure as a legitimate means of
solving all disputes. The Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amend-
ments have specifically prohibited the use of economic pressure to
achieve certain purposes. 7 The Board and the courts have refused to
protect economic pressure in other circumstances on the grounds that
the nature of the dispute was such as to make its use unjustified. In
areas of traditional management concern, it sometimes has been held
that the employer should be able to make decisions without running
the risk of economic combat.' Alternatively the employer's involve-
ment in an issue which concerns his employees may be so slight that it
is considered improper for the employees to cause him economic hard-
ship in pursuing their own interests. In many such cases the policy
5 Originally the determination that economic pressure was protected was also
significant because it meant that the activity could not be declared illegal under statelaw. Compare Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), with UAW v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. (Briggs & Stratton), 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
The construction of § 7 is now less significant in limiting the application of state law
since it is settled that activity need not be protected for state jurisdiction to be ousted.State law is inapplicable to activity that is arguably prohibited or protected and may
be inapplicable even if the activity is neither prohibited nor protected. San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
6 See the discussion in Part I of this article.
7 See Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (4), 61 Stat.
141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1964); National Labor Relations
Act § 8(b)(7), added by 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(7) (1964). Sec-
tion 8(b) (4) limits the use of economic pressure as a means of compelling an em-
ployer to cease dealing with another, and § 8(b) (7) limits the use of economic
pressure for organizational or recogaitional purposes.
8 See, e.g., NLRB v. Reynolds Int'l Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947).
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of the statute, which is aimed at preventing the spread of industrial
disputes, militates against holding the economic pressure protected.
From time to time the courts have also indicated that certain
forms of economic pressure go beyond the purpose of equalizing
economic power and give employees an unfair advantage. In other
cases the Supreme Court seemingly has rejected the contention that
the act provides a basis for picking and choosing among peaceful
economic weapons. Moreover the ability of employers to utilize
economic pressure has been expanded by recent cases.' As a result,
considerable confusion exists as to the state of the law in this area.
Section 7 protects the use of economic pressure by both labor
organizations and by unorganized employees. Where unorganized em-
ployees are involved, the use of economic pressure tends to be brief-
a show of feeling rather than an effort to engage in economic combat.
In such cases it is often difficult to assign a specific cause to the
employees' conduct. Court decisions dealing with the use of economic
pressure by unorganized employees often fail to show awareness of
the special circumstances involved, by limiting the reach of section 7
on the basis of considerations more appropriately applied to the use
of economic pressure by labor organizations.
Where a bargaining relationship is established there is less need
to permit the use of economic pressure by individual employees. The
existence of a recognized representative serves to counterbalance the
employer's economic power. Collective bargaining agreements gen-
erally provide peaceful alternatives which make the use of economic
pressure unnecessary. Moreover, the use of independent economic
pressure is often inconsistent with a recognized union's status as sole
bargaining representative. As a result of these considerations, pressure
brought by employees independently of their recognized bargaining
representative is almost always held unprotected. Generally this is a
sound conclusion. However, it does not follow, as some courts have
held, that independent pressure in support of a recognized union's
legitimate bargaining position should be held unprotected.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the extent of the pro-
tection afforded economic pressure by section 7. Economic pressure
is generally held unprotected for one of three reasons: the purpose
of the pressure; the type of pressure used; the existence of a recog-
nized union. The following discussion will attempt to deal with the
major decisions defining the reach of section 7 in these areas and will
also deal with problems involved in employer response to protected
activity.
QE.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
1967]
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I. THE MEANING OF "PROTECTED"
The extent to which conduct described in section 7 is protected
by the act depends upon the construction of sections 8(a) (1) and
8(a) (3). Section 8(a) (1) makes it an unfair labor practice to
"interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of . .. .
section 7 rights.'0 Section 8 (a) (3) prohibits "discrimination in regard
to . . . any term or condition of employment to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization: . . ., "" Since
section 8(a) (1) is sufficiently broad to include violations of section
8(a) (3),2 it is theoretically possible to analyze all cases of em-
ployer response to protected activity under section 8(a) (1). How-
ever, cases involving responses to union activity have traditionally been
analyzed primarily under section 8(a) (3), and it has generally been
accepted that in such cases the scope of section 8(a) (1) is limited by
the scope of section 8(a) (3).13
If an employer punishes an employee for engaging in activity
protected by section 7, he violates section 8(a) (1) and, if union
activity is involved, section 8(a) (3) as well.'4 This does not mean,
3o National Labor Relations Act, §8(a) (1), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).
" National Labor Relations Act §8(a) (3), added by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964). Section 8(a) (3) is literally applicable only
to cases of employer discrimination. However, the cases indicate that discrimination
in this context occurs whenever the employer treats employees differently than he
would have but for their union activity. Thus, discrimination may encompass any
employer response to union activity. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324
U.S. 793 (1945); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 162 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1947).
It is settled that discouragement of union membership includes discouragement of any
union activity. Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1954).
12 See NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941).
13 In NLRB v. Burnup & Sims Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964), the Court analyzed a
discharge solely in terms of § 8(a) (1), where the employer mistakenly believed
that the discharged employee had engaged in serious misconduct while engaging in
union activity. Although the opinion indicated that this method of analysis might
be used generally to avoid problems involved in the application of § 8(a) (3), the
Court has not followed this approach in subsequent cases. Thus in Textile Workers
Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), the Court stated that certain
employer conduct cannot be said to violate § 8(a) (1) unless it violates § 8(a) (3).
Id. at 269. In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967), the Court
referred to the unfair labor practice charge under §§ 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) as
"grounded primarily in § 8(a) (3)." Id. at 32. Commentators have regarded
Burnup & Sims as a sport in this regard, and have urged that the Court continue to
evaluate problems of employer response to union activity under § 8(a) (3). E.g.,
Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee
Choice, 32 U. Cmi. L. REv. 735 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Getman] ; Meltzer, The
Lockout Cases, 1965 Sup. CT. Rav. 87; Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails,
52 CORN. L.Q. 491 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Oberer]; Note, Proving an 8(a)(3)
Violation: The Changing Standard, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 866 (1966).
14 Court opinions often state that an employer may discharge an employee for any
reason, so long as he does not seek to interfere with the employee's right to join a
union or to engage in collective bargaining. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 254-57 (1939); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937). Such language has rarely been applied once it has been deter-
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however, that an employer is helpless in the face of protected activity.
In many situations, an employer acting to protect his business can
legitimately respond to protected activity in such a way as to make
it costly for the employees to continue such activity. Although such
cases involve "interference" with section 7 rights and generally involve
"discouragement" of union membership, the literal language of the
act is limited to minimize interference with the employer's ability to
run his business as he wishes.'
On the other hand, the mere fact that an employer's response to
economic pressure is motivated by legitimate business considerations
does not necessarily mean that his conduct is permitted by the act.
A violation of section 8(a) (1) may be found regardless of the em-
ployer's motivation if the interference with the employee rights is
considered sufficiently severe to outweigh the employer's economic
interests. 6 Violations of section 8(a) (3) have been found on the
basis of a similar balancing of interests.' Some judicial opinions,
however, indicate that a violation of section 8(a) (3) almost always
requires a finding that the employer was motivated by a desire to
discourage union membership.' Many Supreme Court opinions con-
tain language stressing the importance of employer motivation under
section 8(a) (3). The most emphatic language is contained in
American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 9 where the Supreme Court
held that an employer may lock out his employees in order to support
his bargaining position after an impasse in negotiations has been
mined that the employer was acting in response to protected concerted activity. The
fact that the employer sought to punish the employees for engaging in protected
activity has been deemed sufficient to make his action a violation of the act. NLRB
v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793 (1945). Indeed, in NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964),
the Court held that since the conduct for which an employee was discharged was in
fact protected, the discharge violated § 8(a) (1) even though the employer thought
the employee had engaged in misconduct.
15 See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), holding that absent
special circumstances inhibiting communication "an employer may validly post his
property against nonemployee distribution of union literature . . . . " Id. at 112.
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), holds that an employer
may respond to employee collective bargaining, which is protected activity under § 7,
after impasse has been reached. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333(1938) announced the rule that an employer may hire permanent replacements in
order to continue and protect his business during an economic strike.
16 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) holding that a
no solicitation rule adopted "well before any union activity" and enforced non-dis-
criminatorily nevertheless violated § 8(a) (1) because it interfered unduly with the
employees' organizational rights protected by § 7. See also NLRB v. Burnup & Sims,
Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
17 See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) ; NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); NLRB v. Republic Aviation Corp., 324
U.S. 793 (1945).
18 See Getman 743-52.
19 380 U.S. 300 (1965). See Note, Proving an 8(a) (3) Violation: The Changing
Standard, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 866 (1966).
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reached. The Court stated that a violation of section 8(a) (3) could
be found, in the absence of proof of improper motive, only where the
employer's conduct did not serve a legitimate business purpose and
was likely to have a severe impact on union membership. 0 This
language was inconsistent with prior cases 2 and with dicta in NLRB
v. Brown,22 decided the same day. Predictably, however, the Court
has in effect repudiated this broad language 2 3 and approach in NLRB
v. Great Dane Trailers Inc.
24
The Great Dane case arose out of a strike called over a new con-
tract. Many of the striking employees demanded vacation pay allegedly
owed them under the terms of the expired contract. The company
denied the request on the ground that the contract had expired. It did,
however, as a matter of company policy, grant vacation pay to non-
strikers and strikers who returned to work prior to being replaced. The
Board found that the company's action violated sections 8(a) (1) and
8(a) (3) because it, in effect, punished striking employees for engag-
ing in protected activity.25
The court of appeals, relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in
American Ship Building, denied enforcement on the grounds that
"there are insufficient facts shown by the record to support an in-
ference of unlawful motivation." 26 The court of appeals suggested that
the employer may have acted from legitimate motives, such as the desire
to reduce expenses or the desire to encourage longer tenure. The
Supreme Court reversed. Purporting to distill the essence of its
previous opinions dealing with section 8(a) (3), the Court an-
nounced "several principles of controlling importance": 21
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's
discriminatory conduct was "inherently destructive" of im-
portant employee rights, no proof of an antiunion motivation
is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice
even if the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was
motivated by business considerations. Second, if the adverse
effect of the discriminatory conduct on employee rights is
"comparatively slight," an antiunion motivation must be
proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward
with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifica-
20 380 U.S. at 313.
2 1 E.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) ; NLRB v. Republic
Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
22 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
2 See Getman 748-50.
24 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
25 Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 438 (1964).
26 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 363 F.2d 130, 135 (5th Cir. 1966).
27 388 U.S. at 34.
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tions for the conduct. Thus, in either situation, once it has
been proved that the employer engaged in discriminatory
conduct which could have adversely affected employee rights
to some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish
that it was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of
motivation is most accessible to him.28
The court of appeals was instructed to enforce the Board's order be-
cause the employer "came forward with no evidence of legitimate
motives .... , "29
The Great Dane case purports to do away with the necessity for
establishing improper motive only in cases of "conduct . . . 'inherently
destructive' of important employee rights." " In fact it provides for
balancing of interests in all cases of employer response to union activity,
whenever a specific finding of improper motive is not made.3" The
Board is required to desist from interest balancing only in cases in
which the employer's conduct serves a legitimate and substantial busi-
ness interest and the impact on employee rights is "comparably
slight." 2 In such cases, almost by definition, no violation would be
found on the basis of the strength of the competing interests. It is
difficult to imagine a case in which the Board would find, if given the
opportunity, that the employer's conduct served a legitimate and sub-
stantial business interest and that its impact on employee rights was
comparatively slight; but that the employer was guilty of violating
section 8(a) (3). The process of characterization called for by the
Great Dane opinion will necessarily involve weighing the impact of
employer conduct on union activity against its importance to the
employer. Thus, at the very least, the Great Dane case provides for
balancing of interests in order to determine whether this is the sort
of case in which interests should be balanced.33
28Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.31 In places, however, the Court continued to use the language of motive, even
for cases of conduct inherently destructive of employee rights. Describing the case
in which the Board may find a violation without proof of improper motive, despite
evidence of a valid business purpose, the Court stated, "the Board may nevertheless
draw an inference of improper motive .... ." Id. at 34. This language may possibly
lead the Board to cast its conclusions in terms of improper motivations, or lead some
courts of appeals to reverse Board findings which are not so phrased.
32 Id. at 34.
33 The Great Dane Trailer opinion states that in cases of slight impact on em-
ployee rights, interest balancing is proscribed once the employer introduces evidence
of substantial business justification. It is most unlikely that the Court meant the
introduction of evidence, properly rejected by the Board, to have this effect. It makes
no sense to permit an employer to be exonerated from a finding of an unfair labor
practice on the basis of rejected evidence. Moreover, where the Board rejects evi-
dence of substantial business purpose, it will almost always be as a prelude to a finding
of improper motive. If the Board's factual determination is accepted, a violation is
automatically found. Thus, the Court's statement should be understood to refer to
cases in which the employer's evidence of legitimate purpose is accepted by the Board.
1967]
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The Great Dane case constitutes a welcome shift from the em-
phasis on motivation in the American Ship Building opinion.34 Where
an employer acts in response to union activity, it is fallacious to assume
an inevitable destinction between conduct motivated by legitimate busi-
ness considerations and that motivated by the desire to discourage
union activity.35 Any employer response which makes union activity
costly for the employees involved can be said to serve a legitimate
business purpose. Such conduct is likely to involve a reduction in
costs or aid the employer in continuing to operate his business without
interruption. Even the hope that the employer's action will improve
his bargaining position would seem to constitute a legitimate business
purpose.86 It is unlikely that the employer distinguishes in his thinking
between the economic benefit to be derived and the impact on union
activity. If he does draw the distinction between them, it is likely
that they both constitute reasons for taking the action in question. But
even if it could be established that the employer was totally indifferent
to the impact on union activity and acted solely in response to business
motives, his conduct should not be insulated automatically from the
reach of sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3). The employer should not be
the sole judge of whether his economic interests justify conduct which
makes protected activity costly for the participants.3 7  That determina-
tion should be made by the Board.
34 Unfortunately, the value of the opinion is reduced because the Court masks
the conflict between its opinion and the opinion in the American Ship Building case.
The Court purports to find support for its "principle of controlling importance" in
the American Ship Building opinion and, as already noted, the opinion at one point
refers to the results of interest balancing in terms of motive. It is also unfortunate
that the Court ultimately rested its decision on the company's failure to "meet the
burden of proof" with respect to its motivation. Ibid. As the dissent points out, such
a conclusion "seems particularly unfair" since company counsel might well have relied
on the Court's earlier statements that the Board had to find "'from evidence inde-
pendent of the mere conduct involved that the conduct was primarily motivated by
an antiunion animus . . .' Labor Board v. Brown, 380 U.S. at 288." 388 U.S.
at 39. It is likely that few cases will be decided in the future on the basis of the com-
pany's failure to introduce evidence of legitimate business purpose. Any response is
likely to have economic benefit to the employer either as an effect or as an arguable
goal. Moreover, even if the sole justification is economic pressure in support of the em-
ployer's bargaining demands, it would constitute a legitimate business purpose under
the holdings in the lockout cases and the Court's earlier decision in NLRB v. Insur-
ance Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). Accordingly, it will be a fairly easy
matter for company officials to testify that such legitimate goals motivated their
conduct.
35 Thus in the Great Dane case, whatever business benefits the company sought
to achieve, it knowingly chose to achieve them by penalizing only those employees
who persisted in engaging in protected union activity.
36 See note 34 supra.
37 The best treatment of this issue in a judicial opinion is in NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). In that case, the company argued that the grant
of superseniority to strike replacements did not violate § 8(a) (3) because it was
motivated by the legitimate goal of continuing operations during the strike. In reject-
ing this argument, the Court stated:
But, as often happens, the employer may counter by claiming that his
actions were taken in the pursuit of legitimate business ends and that his
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The remainder of this section will examine the balancing of in-
terests approach as applied to a number of situations involving em-
ployer response to economic pressure.
The Replacement of Striking Employees
As noted above, an employer may take a variety of steps in
response to employee economic pressure without violating the act.
He need not pay employees for the time they spend engaged in such
economic pressure activity. Employee absence for union activity may be
taken into account in computing bonuses,3 and in certain circumstances
economic pressure by employees will justify a lockout 9 or a unilateral
subcontracting of work.40  Possibly the most significant permissible
response is the employer's ability to hire permanent replacements for
striking employees. This employer perogative was recognized by the
Supreme Court, in dictum, in NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co.,41
and since has been largely unquestioned. The basis for the rule is
not completely obvious. The Court in MacKay justified its conclusion
in terms of the employer's right to "protect and continue his busi-
ness." ' The validity of this justification turns on the accuracy of
the assumption which underlies it-that without the ability to per-
manently replace strikers, employers will be unable to operate during
strikes. While the assumption is doubtlessly valid in some instances,
it is questionable that it is valid in enough cases to justify a rule
which imposes so great a risk on those who participate in activity
"protected" by the National Labor Relations Act. It is unfortunate
dominant purpose was not to discriminate or to invade union rights but to
accomplish business objectives acceptable under the Act. Nevertheless, his
conduct does speak for itself-it is discriminatory and it does discourage union
membership and whatever the claimed overriding justification may be, it
carries with it unavoidable consequences which the employer not only foresaw
but which he must have intended.
Id. at 228.
38 The Board has held that time spent on strikes may not "lawfully be considered
the equivalent of normal absence for purposes of determining profit-share forfeiture."
Quality Castings Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 928, 930 (1962); accord, Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Steel Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 855 (1959). In so holding the Board has not balanced the
competing interests. However, the courts have rejected the Board's conclusion.
Quality Castings Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 36 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1960). The result reached by the courts
of appeals in these cases generally was based on the absence of a finding of improper
motive. However, the result is justifiable in terms of the strength of the competing
interests. Getman 741-42.
39 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449 (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
See text accompanying notes 167-77 infra.
40 NLRB v. Robert S. Abbott Publishing Co., 331 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1964);
Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963). Of course, the employer's
ability to take any of these steps may be lost if it is found that he was motivated by
a desire to discourage union membership. On this, all the cases agree.
41304 U.S. 333 (1938).
4 2 Id. at 345.
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that a rule of such importance was adopted without any real effort
to evaluate the factual assumption on which it is based. In view of the
rule's long duration, it is most unlikely that such an evaluation will be
undertaken in the future or that the MacKay rule will be abandoned
in the interest of consistent application of sections 8(a) (1) and
8(a) (3).43 Such questions as exist concern the operation of the
rule rather than its validity.
Theoretically, an employer's ability to permanently replace striking
employees is limited to cases in which such action is taken for economic
motives. An employer may permanently replace strikers in order to
continue his business, but not in order to punish employees for engag-
ing in protected activities. The difficulty, once again, is in trying to
categorize the employer's conduct. Is he replacing for economic
motives or discharging for punitive motives? This is not the type
of determination which can be made readily with the fact-finding tech-
niques used by the Board in the typical 8(a) (3) discriminatory dis-
charge case. Generally there is little in the record other than the
ambiguous act of replacement.4 4 The employer is likely to have mixed
motives. An employer who hires permanent replacements during a
strike almost certainly is motivated in part by the desire to continue
operations during the strike. But he probably is aware that his new
employees are less likely to be union adherents than the strikers they
43 An attack on the MacKay rule is made in Note, Replacement of Workers
During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630 (1966). The Note is on solid ground in pointing
out that the need for the MacKay rule never has been established and that the factual
assumption on which it rests never has been proved. Id. at 636. However, it is also
difficult to make the case for abandoning the rule as is attempted in the Note, without
factual data about the way it operates. A study of the MacKay rule might be quite
useful. Informal discussion with knowledgeable labor relations practitioners and
scholars indicates a general feeling that the right to hire permanent replacements is
rarely used except in cases of strikes by newly-installed unions. If this is true, how-
ever, it would be difficult to determine the extent to which the existence of the rule
shapes the conduct of the parties in a strike, even in situations in which replacements
are not hired.
44 In the typical § 8(a) (3) case, the Board seeks to determine whether an em-
ployee has been discharged because of union activity or because of misconduct. In
making its determination the Board looks to:
a) the timing of the discharge--did it occur during a hotly contested repre-
sentation campaign? b) evidence of anti-union animus by the employer; c) the dis-
chargee's work record; d) the nature of the alleged misconduct-were other people
discharged for undertaking such action? e) was the dischargee warned? f) were the
discharged employees active in the union? g) did the employer commit violations of
§8(a)(1) in responding to the union's organizing campaigns? See, e.g., Dairy
Farmers Transfer, 158 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (April 18, 1966); Freed Oil Co., 158
N.L.R.B. No. 41 (April 25, 1966); Corrie Corp., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (April 28,
1966). Generally in cases of replacement, none of these factors will be present unless
the employer replaces selectively. The timing of replacement is set by the strike.
Union leaders and rank and file are treated alike. There is no need for employer
justification and since bargaining relations have already been established, there is
little likelihood of substantial evidence of anti-union animus. Evidence of discrimina-
tory motivation can be found when replacement is selective, with union activity or
leadership apparently serving as the basis for selection, as was true in the MacKay
case itself.
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replaced, and that his action will have a deterrent effect on any future
strike action. These are advantages which most employers will con-
sider in evaluating whether to hire permanent replacements and which
will be balanced against the risk of violence and permanent bad feelings
which such a move inevitably entails. In short, an inquiry into the
employer's state of mind in such situations would be difficult and the
probable results equivocal.
The Board, in fact, does not seek to evaluate the employer's state
of mind in order to determine the legality of his conduct. Instead, the
Board has devised a fairly mechanical test to distinguish between
replacement (legal) and discharge (illegal). Unless it can be demon-
strated that the employer has singled out for replacement those whom
he knows to be active union members, he is permitted to lay off
permanently any striking employees, as long as they are not notified
that they are replaced or treated as having been replaced before new
employees are hired.4" Employees are improperly discharged if, before
replacements are hired, official action is taken to indicate that they
may not return to work after the strike.48 This test, which has been
approved by the courts,47 is related partly to the employer's reasons for
acting. It is more likely to indicate whether the employer had compe-
tent counsel than to indicate his motives for acting. As long as the
basic assumptions of the MacKay doctrine are accepted, however, the
current rule is probably as good as any which can be devised. The rule
prohibits flagrant attempts to punish protected activity and spells out
what may be done with sufficient clarity.4
The Replacement of Employees for Honoring Picket Lines
The Board and the courts are in general agreement with respect
to the employer's ability to hire permanent replacements for striking
45 See, e.g., Cranston Print Works Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 537, 567 (1956); The
Texas Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1951).
46 Liberty Electronics Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1962) ; Valley Die Cast Corp.,
130 N.L.R.B. 508 (1961).
47 See Bonner-Vawter, Inc. v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 133 (1st Cir. 1961); Kansas
Milling Co. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 413 (10th Cir. 1950).
48 It is true that the clarity of the rule is reduced because an employer may lose
the right to permanently replace if the strike is an unfair labor practice strike, i.e., a
walkout in response to a serious unfair labor practice. See NLRB v. Thayer, 213
F.2d 748, 752 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954); Black Diamond S.S.
Corp. v. NLRB, 94 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1938). However, the Board has been slow
to characterize strikes as unfair labor practice strikes. See, e.g., Cranston Print
Works Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 537 (1956); Greenville Cotton Oil Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1033
(1950). The courts take a similarly restrictive approach. Radiator Specialty Co. v.
NLRB, 336 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1964) ; Winter Garden Citrus Prod. Co-op. v. NLRB,
238 F.2d 128, 129 (5th Cir. 1956). As long as a serious unfair labor practice is
required, interference with the employer's ability to replace is limited, and the rule
probably has the salutory effect of making employers careful to avoid coercive conduct
in prestrike dealings.
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employees. 9 There is less agreement about the related problem of an
employer's ability to respond when his employees refuse to cross a
picket line at the premises of another employer. 0 It is not clear
whether such employee activity is protected. The Board has held that
it is protected,"' but this decision has not been reviewed by the courts.
Even if the courts accept the Board's conclusion that the activity is
protected, there is some indication that they will reject, for these pur-
poses, the distinction between replacement and discharge in evaluating
the employer's response.5 3
Confusion in this area stems from different interpretations of
the Supreme Court's opinion in NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply
Co." In that case, an employee was discharged for refusing to cross
a picket line. The employee's refusal was a violation of the applicable
collective bargaining agreement, but the Board held the agreement
void. It accordingly held the activity protected and the discharge
illegal.55 The Board treated the refusal to cross the picket line as an
economic strike and sought to apply the distinction between discharge
and replacement. Since the employee had been told that he was
"fired" at a time when no replacement had been hired, the Board
concluded that he had been illegally "discharged," and ordered re-
instatement. The court of appeals refused enforcement of the Board's
order and the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals.56 The
Court held that the provision of the collective bargaining agreement
giving the employer the right to discharge the employee for such
behavior was valid. The employee's conduct was therefore un-
protected. But the Court also analyzed the case on the assumption that
the employee's conduct was protected, and it rejected the Board's
49 See note 47 sztpra.
50 With respect to partial work stoppages to support demands made of the primary
employer, the question is whether such stoppages are protected. See text accom-
panying notes 147-169 infra. If such stoppages are held protected, they are treated
like ordinary strikes. See, e.g., NLRB v. J. I. Case Co., 198 F.2d 919 (8th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 917 (1953).
51 Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), petition to set aside denied
sub nor., Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 905 (1964).
52 Although the Board announced in the Redwing Carriers case that the activity
was protected, the discharges of the employees were affirmed. The court, in enforcing
the Board's order, was not required to and did not deal with the protected status of
refusals to cross. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
However, the Second Circuit, in passing on the legitimacy of contract clauses insulating
from discipline employees who honor picket lines, has indicated general agreement with
the Board's conclusion that such activity is protected. Truck Drivers Local 413 v.
NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964).
M NLRB v. L. G. Everist, Inc., 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964).
-54 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
M Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 336 (1952).
56 NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1952), aff'd, 345
U.S. 71 (1953).
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attempt to distinguish between replacement and discharge "in this
context" as "unrealistic and unfounded." 11 Indeed, the Court acidly
described the Board's analysis as "verbal ritual reminiscent of medieval
real property law." 58
When the Board, after some seesawing, concluded once again that
refusal to cross a lawful picket line was protected, it simultaneously
rejected the tests previously employed to distinguish between discharge
and replacement. 9 In its opinion in Redwing Carriers, the Board
stated:
[W]e are convinced that substance, rather than form,
should be controlling. That is, where it is clear from the
record that the employer acted only to preserve efficient
operation of his business, and terminated the services of the
employees only so it could immediately or within a short
period thereafter replace them with others willing to perform
the scheduled work, we can see no reason for reaching dif-
ferent results solely on the basis of the precise words, i.e.,
replacement or discharge, used by the employer, or the
chronological order in which the employer terminated and re-
placed the employees in question.60
The significance of this language depends upon the nature of
the evidence necessary for an employer to demonstrate that he "acted
only to preserve the efficient operation of his business." If the Board,
as its language suggests, meant to cast a burden upon employers
to demonstrate that they acted solely for economic motives, then the
effect of the Redwing decision would be to increase rather than de-
crease the likelihood of violating sections 8(a) (1) and (3). It would
be difficult for an employer to "clearly" establish purity of motive in
the face of the ambiguous factual record which is generally presented
in such a case. The Board has indicated, however, that a respondent
can prove its case by establishing two propositions:
a) that the refusal to cross the picket line constituted a sub-
stantial interference with respondent's business which could not be
overcome by merely assigning another employee to do the work.
b) that replacements were in fact hired. 1
6 345 U.S. at 75.58 Ibid.59 in Auto Parts Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953), the Board affirmed a trial ex-
aminer's ruling based on the position that failure to cross a picket line was unprotected.
The Redwing Carriers case was originally decided on this basis. 130 N.L.R.B. 1208
(1961). However, the Board reconsidered its opinion and, although it reaffirmed
the dismissal of the complaint in the Redwing Carriers case, it did so on the theory
that the dismissal of the employee was a proper response to protected activity, rather
than on the theory that the activity was unprotected. 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962).0 Id. at 1547.
61 Overnight Transportation Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1271 (1965); Redwing Carriers,
Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962).
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The Redwing decision did not mean that the Board was com-
pletely prepared to abandon the distinction between replacement and
discharge in this context. Not only did the fact of and need for
replacement have to be established in order to prove the legitimacy
of the employer's motive, but the timing of replacement continued to
be significant as well. In L. G. Everist, Inc., the Board held that
employees lawfully "discharged" for refusal to cross a picket line were
entitled to reinstatement if they unconditionally applied for jobs before
replacements were hired. 2 As a practical matter, the Everist decision
means that in order to deny reinstatement, an employer must replace
the discharged employee before he secures the performance of the jobs
the discharged employee refused to perform. If the jobs are done with-
out replacement, the employee can ask for his job back and it is an unfair
labor practice to refuse him unless he has already been replaced. Thus
the Board has made only a minor shift in its position in response to the
Rockaway News decision. It is no longer necessary to replace before
notifying the discharged employee of his dismissal. Moreover, it will
not matter if the employer characterizes his action as a discharge.
Nevertheless, the offending employee must still be replaced prior to his
unconditional request for reinstatement.
The Board's decision in Everist was denied enforcement by the
court of appeals. The court did not profess to challenge the Board's
conclusion that refusal to cross a picket line is protected activity,'
but it rejected the conclusion that a "lawfully discharged" employee
has a right to reinstatement if he applies prior to the time he is re-
placed. The court felt that this conclusion, reaffirming the distinction
between replacement and discharge, was a return to the very reasoning
which the Supreme Court so vigorously condemned in Rockaway
News. The court of appeals read Rockaway News to require that the
Board give up the
attempt to equate [employees who refuse to cross picket lines]
with the status of economic strikers and hold that by their
refusal to work they might enter into a legal twilight zone
from which they could return to work at any time of their
own choosing, so long as it was before permanent replace-
ments had been hired."
It is not clear whether the Supreme Court in Rockaway News
objected to the Board's efforts to distinguish between replacement and
discharge or whether it objected only to the Board's mechanistic ap-
62142 N.L.R.B. 193 (1963).
63 NLRB v. L. G. Everist, Inc., 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964).
4Id. at 318.
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plication of the distinction, i.e., its reliance on the words used in
notifying the employee of his dismissal and in requiring that the
replacement be hired before the employee involved be dismissed. There
is language in the opinion supporting each interpretation.6' It is
likely that this question will ultimately be resolved by the Supreme
Court together with the general question of the protected status of
refusals to cross picket lines.
It is hard to see why the Court would accept the conclusion that
such activity is protected but insist that the employer be given the
right to discharge employees for engaging in it so long as he is not
discriminatorily motivated. This conclusion is tantamount to holding
the activity unprotected since a discharge for unprotected activity
violates the act if the employer is discriminatorily motivated. "6
Although the court of appeals did not deal directly with the ques-
tion, the Everist opinion rests on the semi-articulated assumption that
a refusal to cross a picket line is an unjustified interference with the
business of the employer and provides "cause" for discharge.67 If this
characterization is rejected, the Board's analysis appears to be entirely
appropriate. A discharge for refusing to cross a picket line necessarily
interferes with the exercise of section 7 rights and violates the literal
language of the act. Such interference can be justified only if it is
necessary for the efficient operation of the employer's business. The
Board has recognized that the employer's economic interest may out-
weigh the employee's interest in mutual aid; it has tried to limit the
right to discharge to such cases. To this end, the Board has adopted
a rule which reflects the extent of interference with the employer's
business. If the employer was able to manage merely by reassigning
his personnel, then it should be permissible for the Board to conclude
65 The Court objected to the Board's approach "in this context." That "this
context" refers to the facts of the particular case is suggested by the Court's next
point: "And there is no finding that he was not replaced." 345 U.S. at 75. "In this
context" could also refer, in general, to cases of refusals to cross picket lines, as is
suggested by the favorable reference to the decision of the court of appeals, which for
the most part seemed to reject the distinction between refusals to cross and economic
strikes.
66A finding of discriminatory motivation is, of course, equivalent to finding that
the unprotected activity was merely a pretext and the real reason for the discharge
is union membership or activity. In the typical § 8(a) (3) case, the issue is whether
the employer's alleged reason based on some form of unprotected activity was
the real reason for the employee's discharge. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc.,
119 N.L.R.B. 104 (1957). In light of the existing case law, the conclusion that
refusal to cross a picket line is protected activity is significant, whatever scope is
given to the employer to respond. If activity is protected, a contract by which the
employer agrees not to punish an employee for such behavior is legal. If the activity
is unprotected, such agreements would probably violate § 8(e) of the act. National
Labor Relations Act § 8(e), added by 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964).
See Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
67 "However, we see no difference betveen the refusal to cross a picket line in
violation of such a bargaining contract and the refusal to cross a picket line in vio-
lation of the ordinary and implied obligations of employment." NLRB v. L. G. Everist,
Inc., 334 F.2d 312, 317 (8th Cir. 1964).
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that the degree of interference with his economic interests was too
small to justify punishing an employee for exercising his statutory
right. Or, if the employee changes his mind and expresses a willing-
ness to do the job before the employer has committed himself to
another, there is no legitimate reason why his reinstatement should be
denied. The analogy to an economic striker in this context is apt.
Once such an employeq expresses a willingness to work there is no
legitimate interest which the employer can invoke to refuse him
employment unless his place has been filled. Neither the employer's
displeasure with his actions nor the possibility of similar conduct in
the future should afford a basis for discharging him. The only per-
missible employer justification for dismissing an employee who is
engaged in protected conduct should be the desire to avoid interference
with current operations.
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE REACH OF SECTION 7 BASED ON THE
PURPOSE FOR WHICH ECONOMIC PRESSURE Is USED
The purposes for which concerted activity may be undertaken are
broadly stated. In particular, the statutory phrase, "mutual aid or
protection" can be read to encompass almost any goal-oriented group
action." However, the reach of section 7 has been reduced by finding
limitations suggested not by its language but by other sections and
policies of the act. Section 8(b) prohibits various types of concerted
activity. Such specifically prohibited activity properly falls outside the
protection of section 7." It would make little sense to hold that
section 7 protects that which section 8(b) prohibits.
One of the central unanswered questions about the scope of
section 7 is the extent to which lawful economic pressure for a
legitimate purpose may be held unprotected. In NLRB v. Washington
Aluminum Co.,"° the Supreme Court rejected the position that eco-
6 8 An individual who participates in group action does so either because he hopes
to profit personally from the effort or because he seeks to aid some or all of the others
who participate. Either motive will bring the activity within "mutual aid or protec-
tion." See NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d
Cir. 1942). Many of the activities conceivably encompassed by this phrase are
already included in § 7-the right of self-organization; the right to "form, join, or
assist labor organizations;" the right to "bargain collectively." Perhaps the most
significant addition which the phrase, "other mutual aid or protection," makes to the
scope of § 7 is to emphasize that employee activity which is not related to conventional
union organization or activity is nonetheless protected. NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948); NLRB v.
Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1945). Thus the phrase, "mutual aid or protection,"
grants to unrepresented employees the right to protest against working conditions
and the right to make common cause with others outside of the bargaining unit.
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); Signal Oil & Gas Co.,
160 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (Aug. 24, 1966).
69 See Cox 325-28.
70 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
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nomic pressure could be held unprotected if its use was deemed unwise
or unreasonable. In that case, the Court held that a walkout by em-
ployees to protest cold working conditions was protected. The
company argued that the activity was unprotected since it was already
taking steps to alleviate the trouble and the employees had not pre-
sented a specific demand to which the company could respond. The
Court rejected this argument:
The fact that the company was already making every effort
to repair the furnace and bring heat into the shop that
morning does not change the nature of the controversy that
caused the walkout. At the very most, that fact might tend
to indicate that the conduct of the men in leaving was un-
necessary and unwise, and it has long been settled that the
reasonableness of workers' decisions to engage in concerted
activity is irrelevant to the determination of whether a labor
dispute exists or not. 1
Although the Court was construing the term "labor dispute,"
its ultimate conclusion was that the employees were engaged in "con-
certed activities which Section 7 of the Act protects." 72
In Washington Aluminum, economic pressure was used to protest
working conditions-an area of traditional employee concern. In
subsequent cases, the courts of appeals also have found the use of
economic pressure for traditional purposes protected without regard
to its reasonableness.73 But the courts have not necessarily held
economic pressure protected in all cases where employees have acted
for mutual aid or protection. They have indicated, without really
addressing themselves to the problem, that on the outer boundaries
of the concept of mutual aid or protection, there are subjects with
respect to which the act will protect expressions of employee sentiment,
but not the use of economic pressure.
Economic Pressure in Areas of Traditional Management Prerogatives
The conclusion that economic pressure for a legitimate purpose
is unprotected has been adopted most often with respect to employee
action to protest changes in supervision. The Board usually holds
such activity protected by section 7 7 but the courts have generally
711d. at 16.721d. at 17.
73 See, e.g., NLRB v. Phaostron Instrument & Electronic Co., 344 F.2d 855, 858
(9th Cir. 1965) ; NLRB v. Holcombe, 325 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1963).
74 See Dobbs Houses, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 885 (1962). Theoretically the Board
decides each case on its facts; only when "the identity and capability of the supervisor
involved has a direct impact on the employees' own job interests and on their per-
formance of the work they are hired to do" are the employees "legitimately concerned
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held it unprotected." Some of the early opinions suggested that
employees do not have a legitimate interest in the selection of super-
vision, so that no concerted activity for the purpose of protesting the
employer's actions in this area would be protected. The leading case
is NLRB v. Reynolds International Pen Co."6 in which employees
staged a short walkout to protest a change in foremen. The court
simply announced that the change of foremen was a "prerogative of
management" " and therefore held the activity unprotected. The court
did not explain why a "prerogative of management" could not also be
the basis of activity for mutual aid or protection and subsequent cases
have added little or nothing by way of satisfactory explanation.
It would be difficult to defend the position that protests over
changes in supervision do not come within the literal definition of
"mutual aid or protection." 78 Presumably the justification for holding
protests about supervision outside section 7 is that management should
be free to choose its own representative without interference. Labor
should not even be permitted to make common cause with those whose
responsibility it is to deal with requests about working conditions. 79 In
order for the system of industrial relations contemplated by the act to
operate properly, a separation between management and labor must be
with his identity." Id. at 888. However, as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
pointed out, "it is difficult to imagine a case in which the identity and capabilities
of a supervisor cannot be said to have a direct impact on the employees' job interest
and work performance." American Art Clay Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 88, 90 (7th Cir.
1964). In any event, the Board has found protests over changes in supervision pro-
tected in Dobbs Houses, Inc., supra; American Art Clay Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 624 (1963) ;
Plastilite Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 180 (1965). The Board applies the same rule to em-
ployee protests about other personnel matters. See Hagopian & Sons, Inc., 162
N.L.R.B. No. 12 (Dec. 20, 1966).
75 See American Art Clay Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1964); Dobbs
Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp. v.
NLRB, 264 F.2d 637 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959); NLRB v. Ford
Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Coal Creek Coal Co.,
204 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1953) (dictum); NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir.
1952) (dictum); NLRB v. Reynolds Int'l Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947);
cf. Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949). In cases in which
other employees were discharged along with supervisors, protests have been held
protected. See NLRB v. Puerto Rico Rayon Mills Inc., 293 F.2d 941 at 946 (1st
Cir. 1961); cf. Summit Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1958).
76 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947).
77 Id. at 684.
78 Protests over changes in supervision are generally attempts to make common
cause with others who might aid the employees and also to affect working conditions.
See NLRB v. Puerto Rico Rayon Mills, Inc., 293 F.2d 941 (1st Cir. 1961); Summit
Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1958).
79 As a rule of thumb, it is fairly clear that where employees protest the
hiring, firing, or demotion of a foreman or other management official, they
are not acting within the province of mutual aid or protection. The policy
behind the rule is evident. It demonstrates a recurrent caution on the part
of the courts lest they place an employer in a position which would enable his
employees to dictate their own terms of employment. A foreman's interests
are properly aligned with management. To paraphrase a notorious statement,
labor should not be allowed to choose its own watchdog.
Note, 1955 ILL. L.F. 129, 134. See also Note, 44 ILL. L. REv. 234 (1949).
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maintained. This is explicitly recognized in the statute. It is for this
very reason that supervisors are excluded from the definition of "em-
ployee" and accordingly, from the bargaining unit under section
2(3)."° The discharge of a supervisor because of his union sympathies
is not necessarily an unfair labor practice.8 The policy separating
management and labor is recognized also in section 8 (b) (1) (B) which
makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to "restrain
or coerce . . . an employer in the selection of his representatives for
the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances." 82
The argument is reasonable and persuasive when it applies to
union interference with the selection of top or middle level management.
The cases, however, have almost all concerned protests by unorganized
employees about the identity of working foremen. It is in such circum-
stances that the case for a legitimate employee interest is strongest.
Certain practical aspects of industrial life lead to the conclusion that
the selection of foremen is within the legitimate interests of employees.
The identity of the foreman is a significant aspect of the employee's
working conditions. This is true in a more personal way when a
foreman rather than a higher level supervisor is involved. The impact
of high level supervision is largely felt in terms of broad managerial
decisions. But the moods, interest and personality of a foreman, quite
apart from managerial decisions, will significantly affect an employee's
feelings about his job.
Secondly, foremen often have little authority. They usually are not
in a position to exercise discretion or to "let employees dictate
their own terms of employment." Foremen often occupy a position
midway between management and the employees. Although foremen
are not protected by the act, they generally have considerable common
interest with the rank and file. Their hours, pay, retirement and
benefits are often similar to and are generally shaped by those of the
employees. It is not uncommon for foremen to consider themselves as
workers rather than management. Top management may share this
conception of the position of the foremen." This ambiguity in the
role of the foreman is attested to by the steady number of close cases
80 "Section 2 . . .
(3) The term "employee" . . . shall not include . . . any individual employed
as a supervisor. . . ." National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), as amended, 61 Stat.
137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
81 Such a discharge may be held to violate § 8(a) (1) because of the impact on
the other employees. NLRB v. Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc., 213 F.2d 209, 217(5th Cir. 1954).
82 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (1) (B), 61 Stat
141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (B) (1964).
W See generally Roethlisberger, The Foremm: Master and Victim. of Double-
talk, 23 HRRv. Bus. REv. 283 (1945).
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in which the Board is asked to distinguish between a working foreman
and a leadman.'
Thus there is a legitimate employee interest in the identity of the
foreman. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the foreman's role
in the collective bargaining process is jeopardized by employee protests
in favor of or against a particular foreman. As will be noted below,
the existing cases demonstrate that protests about changes in super-
vision cannot easily be divorced from protests about working
conditions.
The existence of a legitimate employee interest in first level super-
vision has been recognized in a few cases 85 and the question has
been whether the economic pressure is permitted.86 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in NLRB v. Dobbs Houses that a
protest-walkout over the ouster of a supervisor was unprotected. The
court announced a two-step test for determining whether activity is
protected. "First it is necessary to determine the legitimacy of the
employee's interest." 87 The court conceded that in the case before it
and in most cases involving protests over supervision, the employees
have a legitimate concern. But the court found the walkout unpro-
tected on the basis of "the other test which must be met to determine
the protected character of the employee's activity . . . that the means
be reasonably related to the nds sought to be achieved." 8
The court did not explain why the walkout was unrelated to the
ends sought to be achieved. In light of the Supreme Court's language
in Washington Aluminum, an effort to analyze the reasonableness of
economic pressure should be carefully explained. The court in Dobbs
Houses offered no such explanation. It distinguished Washington
Aluminum on the ground that the issue there was whether the presence
of alternative courses of action made otherwise protected conduct un-
protected. In Dobbs Houses the court noted that "the reasonableness of
the conduct had to be determined to ascertain whether in fact it is pro-
tected." "' The distinction is purely verbal. It fails to explain why
S 4 Mr. William T. Little, NLRB Regional Director for the 25th region and one
of the Board's leading experts on the NLRA, has told me that the determination
of foreman status is the most difficult question with which he has to deal.
85NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960);
NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 845 (1948).
86 Protests not involving walkouts were found to be protected in Phoenix Mutual
and Guernsey-Muskinguin Elec. Co-op. Walkouts were held unprotected in Dobbs
Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963) and American Art Clay Co.
v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1964).
87325 F.2d at 538.
s8 Ibid.
89 Id. at 539.
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reasonableness of economic pressure was used to determine whether the
activity was protected in one case but not in the other.
It is possible to defend a different rule for cases involving economic
pressure to protest changes in supervision, than for cases involving
efforts to change general working conditions. A similar distinction
is drawn in collective bargaining between mandatory and permissive
subjects of bargaining. The Supreme Court's opinion in NLRB v.
Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.90 established that there are
certain topics which are appropriately under the exclusive control of
one side or the other in a collective bargaining relationship. While
each party may suggest a change with regard to these permissive
subjects of bargaining, it cannot bargain to an impasse or use economic
pressure in support of its position."'
Management's choice of supervisors is probably a permissive
rather than mandatory subject of bargaining. 2  Where bargaining
relationships are established, the employer may act as he chooses with-
out prior consultation with the union. Although the union may
express its position with respect to selection of foremen, it may not
strike to support this position. The cases dealing with protests over
changes in supervision draw the same distinction. Employees are
protected in stating their position but not in exerting economic
pressure. 3
It is reasonable to apply the same distinction to the use of eco-
nomic pressure by unrepresented employees. It makes no sense to say
that these employees are protected for engaging in activity which would
be an unfair labor practice if undertaken by a recognized union. Under
the scheme of the act, a bargaining representative has more, not less,
power than individual employees in proposing and supporting changes
in working conditions.
90356 U.S. 342 (1958). The employer insisted that the collective agreement
contain two clauses: one requiring a secret pre-strike vote by the employees on the
company's last offer; the other, a recognition clause excluding the international union,
which had been certified, as a party to the contract. The Supreme Court held that
these matters fell outside the statutory definition of those matters about which the
parties were required to bargain under § 8(d) : "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment." Although the union could bargain about these issues if
it chose to, it was not required to and, therefore, the company's insistence upon them
violated § 8(a) (5).
91 The case did not deal with union pressures over matters within the economic
control of management, but its reasoning made clear that it would be improper for
a union to insist on a matter not within the statutory phrase and normally considered
to be a subject for management prerogative. See Douds v. International Longshore-
men's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Detroit Resilient Floor Decorators Union
(Mill Floor Covering, Inc.), 136 N.L.R.B. 769 (1962).
92See NLRB v. Retail Clerks IntVl Ass'n, 203 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 839 (1954).
93 See note 86 supra. See Comment, 11 VmLL. L. Rzv. 655, 658-59 (1966).
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On the other hand, the Borg-Warner decision has been criticized
for imposing limitations on the process of collective bargaining." It is
difficult to fathom the reason for the rule and so it is difficult to justify
limitations on its application. It is reasonably clear, however, that the
Court was moved to limit freedom of action with respect to permissive
subjects in order to make the duty to bargain over the mandatory sub-
jects more meaningful. 5 Where no bargaining relationship exists, this
justification for the application of the rule is not available. In most of
the cases in which employees have sought to influence the employer's
choice of supervisor, there was no established pattern of collective bar-
gaining. In the majority of cases there was no union activity of any
kind but merely a spontaneous action by employees. 6 It is difficult to
see why a doctrine designed to facilitate collective bargaining should be
applied outside a bargaining situation to limit the rights of unorganized
employees to engage in concerted activity about a matter of legitimate
concern.
In response it may be argued that although the Borg-Warner
doctrine is inapplicable, as such, where no collective bargaining rela-
tionship exists, some of the reasons which support it apply with
greater or equal force to the problem of protection of economic force
by section 7. There are subjects with respect to which management
interests are clearly paramount. In order that the act recognize the
right of management to operate its business, management should be
permitted to make decisions in these areas without having to worry
about strikes and work stoppages. The choice of management per-
sonnel is one of the most obvious examples of such a subject. It may
be true that low level supervision is of sufficient interest to employees
that an expression of views should be protected. The difference be-
tween the strength of employee interest and management interest is
sufficiently great, however, that the act should not be construed to
make decisions in this area subject to a test of economic power.9 7
!4 Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term 1957, 44
VA. L. REV. 1057, 1074-86 (1958).
95 "Such conduct is in substance a refusal to bargain about the subjects that are
within the scope of mandatory bargaining." 356 U.S. at 349.
96The employees were unorganized in: American Art Clay Co. v. NLRB, 328
F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1964) ; Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963) ;
NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op, Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960);
NLRB v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1958) ; NLRB v. Reynolds
Int'l Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947). In Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp. v.
NLRB, 264 F.2d 637 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959) and NLRB v.
Puerto Rico Rayon Mills, Inc., 293 F.2d 941 (1st Cir. 1961), the employees were
about to be organized. In NLRB v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 204 F.2d 579 (10th Cir.
1953), the employer had recognized a company union in order to thwart outside
organization.
97 See Note, 1955 IL. L.F. 132; Note, 44 ILL. L. REv. 234 (1949).
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In evaluating the argument just made, it should be kept in mind
that this problem will almost always arise in unorganized plants. In
organized plants, the use of economic pressure is subject to special
limitations-economic pressure by individual employees will almost
always be unprotected and economic pressure by the union will be
limited by the Borg-Warner doctrine and the contract.'s In unorga-
nized plants the use of pressure can rarely be assigned a specific cause.
The cases indicate that when unorganized employees walk out, osten-
sibly to protest changes in supervision, it is likely to be because general
dissatisfaction with working conditions has come to a head.9  In a
large majority of the cases it would be inaccurate to describe the
concerted activity as being solely for the purpose of protesting changes
in supervision."' 0 The change in supervision represented a possible
change in working conditions, which mobilized existing feelings of
dissatisfaction and enabled the employees to develop sufficient cohesion
to undertake group action.
It is likely that such group action would not have occurred were
it not for existing feelings of dissatisfaction. Otherwise satisfied em-
ployees are not likely to undertake concerted activity to protest a change
in supervision. Furthermore, in those reported cases in which the
employees did not belong to a union, the concerted activity was hardly
9s8 See generally Part IV of this article.
99 The Board has recognized in its decisions that concerted activity about changes
in supervision are often related to unhappiness with current or proposed working
conditions. In some cases the Board has found as a fact that dissatisfaction with
working conditions was the cause of the concerted activity. Dobbs Houses, Inc.,
135 N.L.R.B. 885 (1962); American Art Clay Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 624 (1963). The
courts have refused to find that the walkout was caused by dissatisfaction with working
conditions, on the ground that the employees would not have walked out on the basis
of such conditions alone and because the stated aim and the action which would have
put a stop to the walkout was revocation of the supervisory change. American Art
Clay Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d at 91; Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d at 537.
As noted above, the Board has adopted the doctrine that concerted activity to pro-
test a change in supervision is protected: "Where . . . such facts establish that
the identity and capability of the supervisor involved has a direct impact on the
employees own job interest and on their performance of the work they are hired
to do." Dobbs Houses, Inc., .rzpra. Conceivably the Board's rule was meant to
select out those cases in which unhappiness over a change in supervision reflected
more general dissatisfaction with working conditions. If so, however, the Board's
phrasing of the rule is unfortunate because it would cover cases in which the change
in supervision is objected to by the employees solely on the basis of the personality
of the supervisor.
100 In NLRB v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 204 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1953), the protest
over the ousting of a foreman was related to employee unhappiness over the establish-
ment of a company union. In American Art Clay Co. v. NLRB, Vtupra note 99, the
protest over a change in foremen was related to a fear that a change in working
conditions would accompany the change in supervision. In Dobbs Houses, Inc. v.
NLRB, supra note 99, the restaurant supervisor whose ouster was protested was
viewed by the protesting waitresses as their only protection against the admittedly
improper treatment by the manager. In NLRB v. Reynolds Int'l Pen Co., 162 F.2d
680 (7th Cir. 1947), the discharge of the foreman was thought by the employees to
be an indication of future wage cuts. As was true in several other cases, the protest
here sparked an overall effort to organize the employees. See also NLRB v. Puerto
Rico Rayon Mills Inc., 293 F.2d 941 (1st Cir. 1961) and NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948)
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more than an expression of employee sentiment. 01 Walkouts to pro-
test changes in supervision have generally been short-an effort to
dramatize the strength of employee sentiment, rather than an effort
to use economic coercion. Thus cases distinguishing between protest
and pressure are likely to treat differently two forms of behavior which
are essentially the same.
Because the use of economic pressure by unorganized employees
is likely to be the result of general dissatisfaction and may well be the
prelude to formal organization, the impact of holding it unprotected
is likely to be very great. The employer will discharge those em-
ployees likely to take the lead in organization or protest. Since, in
most cases, the protest is in fact a protest against undesirable working
conditions, it follows that any retaliation will be seen as a response to
protest over working conditions. Whatever the employer's motive,
the discharges are likely to cause the remaining employees to think that
any concerted activity or attempts at organization will lead to retalia-
tion. Thus the discharge of employees for protesting about a change
in supervision is likely to inhibit the exercise of section 7 rights gen-
erally, and will have the type of impact which sections 8(a) (1) and
(3) were intended to prevent.
Economic Pressure in Situations in Which Management
Interest Is Limited
Several cases raise the question of whether management's interest
in a subject might be so remote and tangential that economic pressure
about the subject ought to be unprotected. Two situations raise
the question: those involving demands made of third parties 0 and
instances where employees of one employer seek to support employees of
another. 0
3
Cases Involving Attempts to Influence Third Parties
It has long been recognized that employee efforts to influence
parties other than their own employer may be for "mutual aid or
protection." 104 There is, however, language in the opinion in G. & W.
101 See cases cited in note 96 supra; NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra
note 100; NLRB v. Kennametal Inc., 182 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1950); Ace Handle
Corp., 100 N.L.R.B. 1279 (1952). Real strikes resulted only in the situations in
which the incident was part of a major drive for union organization. NLRB v.
Puerto Rico Rayon Mills, Inc.,, supra note 100; NLRB v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp.,
258 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1953).
102 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bretz Fuel Co., 210 F.2d 392 (4th Cir. 1954).
103 NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir.
1942); Bethlehem Ship Bldg. Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 930 (1st Cir., 1940), dismissed
on inotion of petitioner, 312 U.S. 710 (1941).
104 See, e.g., Redwing Carriers Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), petition to set
aside denied sub norn. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
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Electric Specialty Co. v. NLRB, 105 which suggests that only matters
"subject to some control or influence by the employer" 108 give rise to
employee response for mutual aid or protection.
In G. & W., an employee was discharged for circulating a peti-
tion protesting the operation of the company credit union. Although
employment by the company was a prerequisite to membership in the
credit union, the credit union was completely independent of the
company management. The company argued that "in order to qualify
as a protected activity the activity must . . . relate to a condition
of employment." ' The Board found the activity protected. A
majority concluded that "the protection afforded by section 7 is not
strictly confined to activities which are immediately related to the
employment relationship or working conditions but extends to the
type of indirectly related activity involved herein." 108 The majority
pointed out that to limit protection to activity designed to improve
working conditions would be to give no meaning to the phrase "or
other mutual aid or protection." 109 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed. The court laid great stress on the fact "the
activity involved no request for any action upon the part of the
Company and did not concern a matter over which the Company had
control." 110 The court's emphasis on these facts limits the definition
of "mutual aid or protection" by the use of concepts which are used to
regulate the process of collective bargaining. This assumption is made
fairly explicit by the court's statement:
The sweep of the broad interpretation inherent in the Board's
application of the "or other mutual aid or protection" clause
to the facts of the instant case gives to that clause a meaning
and effect which in our opinion is out of harmony with the
immediate context in which the clause appears .... "I
Undoubtedly the word "context" here refers to the fact that the
phrase "collective bargaining" immediately precedes the phrase "mutual
aid or protection" in the statutory language.
305 360 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1966).
10G Id. at 876.
107 G. & W. Elec. Specialty Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1136, 1147 (1965).
1O Id. at 1137. Member Jenkins dissented. He argued that "by virtue of the
doctrine of ejusdem generis other mutual aid and protection" should be "construed
to apply only to matters of the same general kind or class as the preceding specifically
mentioned matters," matters directly related to collective bargaining or the employ-
ment relationship. Id. at 1140.
109 Id. at 1138.
110 G. & W. Electric Specialty Co. v. N.L.R.B., 360 F.2d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1966).
111 Id. at 876.
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The G. & W. case is not easy to reconcile with earlier cases.
Honoring a picket line," 2 assisting organizing efforts at another
employer's business," 3 agitating for new legislation,"' protesting to
a government agency "5 and expressing solidarity with striking milk
producers," 6 have all been held protected, although involving matters
outside the control of the employer. In Bethlehem Ship Bldg. Corp.
v. NLRB,"7 an employer objected to employee activity "to give public
endorsement to a bill pending in the Massachusetts legislature increas-
ing weekly benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act."
Judge Magruder, speaking for the First Circuit, concluded that
such employee activity was protected:
But the right of employees to self-organization and to engage
in concerted activities, now guaranteed by Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, is not limited to direct col-
lective bargaining with the employer, but extends to other
activities for "mutual aid or protection" including appearance
of employee representatives before legislative committees."81
It is difficult to see why legislative lobblying for such matters,
which do not constitute "working conditions" as that term is used
in sections 8(d) and 9(a), is protected, while activity to protest
operation of an employee credit union is not. The Board's inter-
pretation of "mutual aid or protection" seems more consistent with
the language and policy of the act than the interpretation of the court
in G. & W. The fact that the employer's interest and power were
minimal does not militate in favor of holding the activity unprotected.
It must be remembered that the decision whether the activity is pro-
tected determines whether the employer may use the activity as a basis
for discipline. In large part the court used the employer's lack of inter-
est in such activity as a basis for holding that he was free to fire an
employee for engaging in it.
It is true that the court also sought to justify its conclusion on
the ground that the employees as such did not have a legitimate in-
112 Truck Driver's Union Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964).
113 NLRB v. J. G. Boswell Co., 136 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1943).
114 Bethlehem Ship Bldg. Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 930 (1st Cir. 1940), dismissed
on motion of petitioner, 312 U.S. 710 (1941).
"15 Socony Vacuum Tanker Men's Ass'n v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 369 F.2d 480
(2d Cir. 1966).
116 NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir.
1942).
117 114 F.2d 930 (1st Cir. 1940), dismissed on motion of petitioner, 312 U.S. 710
(1941).
1 1 8 Id. at 937.
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terest in the operation of the credit union. But this argument was
hardly more than a makeweight. The credit union was only open to
employees of G. & W. Electric Specialty Co. It was an advantage of
employment which was recognized and exploited by the company.
The argument that the employer's lack of interest or control
affords a legitimate basis for holding that a subject does not come
within "mutual aid or protection!" is unconvincing. The argument
that economic pressure should be unprotected in such cases is more
convincing. Where there is a dispute between groups of employees
or when the employees are seeking to influence legislation, the em-
ployer is not a party to the controversy and there is no reason why
he should be forced to permit his business to be used as a battleground.
Of course, it is most unlikely that economic pressure will be directed
specifically at the employer in such cases, but it is possible that he
will be indirectly subject to pressure. On occasion, for example,
employees have left work without permission to attend a legislative
hearing, to attend a union meeting or to put pressure on the union's
bargaining committee. The extent to which such activity is protected
by section 7 is unclear from the reported cases.'19 Certainly the em-
ployer should be able to protect himself against such pressure. The
question is whether the employer's interests are adequately protected
by his ability to replace the employees involved. Such walkouts are
generally brief. If the Board's conclusion in Everist, that employees
are entitled to reinstatement if they apply before being replaced, is
followed, the employer will often not be able to dismiss employees
involved because of the difficulty in finding replacements during the
short time the employees are away from work. The process of hiring
replacements is likely to be as costly as continuing to employ the errant
employees. The real advantage to the employer is that discharging
these employees may deter similar conduct in the future. There are
strong reasons for permitting him to do so. Such walkouts cause
economic damage to the employer who is generally not a party to the
controversy. In most cases the employees can achieve the same results
11 The Board sometimes has held that it is a violation of the act to discharge
an employee who leaves work, without permission, to attend a Board hearing. Pearson
Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 910 (1962); Chautauqua Hardware Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 723,
enforced, 208 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1953). However, in each of these cases the respondent
was to some extent motivated by a general hostility to unions. In other cases, where
the testimony of the witness was not needed, the Board has found leaving work to
attend a hearing unprotected. Standard Packaging Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 628 (1963).
While the Board would hold that leaving work without permission to attend hearings
of other government agencies is protected, one court of appeals has taken the position
that absent proof of anti-union motive, a discharge for such activity does not violate
the act. NLRB v. Superior Co., 199 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1952). In Harnischfeger Corp.
v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1953), the court of appeals reversed the Board and
found that leaving work to put pressure on the union bargaining committee was not
protected activity.
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without resorting to such tactics. Walkouts of this type are less likely
to be the result of general dissatisfaction than are those protesting
changes in supervision. It is easier in these situations to distinguish
cases involving economic pressure from those involving an expression
of opinion.
The extent to which discharges in such cases will have a coercive
impact on future union organization will depend upon the nature of
existing labor-management relations. If there is a 'well established
union, there probably will be little impact. If organization is non-
existent or just beginning, the impact may well be severe. Since the
truth of many of the generalizations made above is also subject to
variation in particular cases, it is difficult to establish a rule which
will always reflect a proper accommodation of the conflicting interests.
Arguably, the Board should decide on a case-by-case basis whether
the activity is protected, by taking into account the nature of the issue
about which the employees are concerned, the state of labor relations,
the number of employees who walk out, the length of the walkout, the
degree to which the employer was damaged economically and similar
factors. The difficulty with case-by-case adjudication is that it makes
it very difficult to predict in advance what action the employer may
take. Since reinstatement with back pay is likely to be the remedy,
a wrong guess can be quite costly to an employer. Counsel should be
able to determine how the Board will evaluate putative action.
120
Since the employer's interest is likely to outweigh the factors which
favor holding the activity protected, it should be held unprotected
unless it is determined that the activity was in substantial part a
protest against existing conditions by unorganized workers and, thus,
the first step towards self organization.
Making Common Cause with Other Employees:
Refusals to Cross Picket Lines
It is generally accepted that employee activity in support of em-
ployees of another employer who are involved in a labor dispute is
activity for "mutual aid or protection." The reasons for this were
expressed by Judge Learned Hand in a characteristically compelling
120 Where Board hearings are involved, a mass walkout to attend the hearing is
likely to be a reflection of dissatisfaction either with general conditions (if the hearing
is a representation hearing) or with the actions which gave rise to an unfair labor
practice complaint. The action of the employees may represent an awakening sense
of group solidarity. When the writer was with the N.L.R.B., the General Counsel
decided to issue a complaint in a case in which a group of employees who had been
the victims of a sweetheart contract left work en masse to support a new union at a
Board hearing. The General Counsel properly decided that the employer was not
a neutral party who was being injured by the concerted activity, but that the em-
ployees' action represented an effort to protest the previous situation.
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passage in NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Suiss Chocolates Co."x
The case arose when the chocolate company fired an employee who
called a meeting of the local union to encourage employees of the
company to express support for a union of milk suppliers. The
Board held that the activity was protected.' 22 The Second Circuit
affirmed. Judge Hand rejected the argument that the activity was
unprotected because the members of the milk union were not members
of the bargaining unit and were not "employees" under the act.
Certainly nothing elsewhere in the act limits the scope of the
language to "activities" designed to benefit other "em-
ployees"; and its rationale forbids such a limitation. When
all the other workmen in a shop make common cause with a
fellow workman over his separate grievance, and go out on
strike in his support, they engage in a "concerted activity"
for "mutual aid or protection," although the aggrieved work-
man is the only one of them who has any immediate stake in
the outcome. The rest know that by their action each one
of them assures himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the
support of the one whom they are all then helping; and the
solidarity so established is "mutual aid" in the most literal
sense, as nobody doubts. So too of those engaging in a
"sympathetic strike," or secondary boycott; the immediate
quarrel does not itself concern them, but by extending the
number of those who will make the enemy of one the enemy
of all, the power of each is vastly increased. It is one thing
how far a community should allow such power to grow;
but, whatever may be the proper place to check it, each
separate extension is certainly a step in "mutual aid or pro-
tection." . . . It is true that in the past courts often failed
to recognize the interest which each might have in a solidarity
so obtained . . . , but it seems to us that the act has put
an end to this.'
As indicated, the Wagner Act embraced the philosophy that
employees should be free to support each other. The Taft-Hartley
and Landrum-Griffin amendments, however, severely limited the extent
to which economic pressures can be used to make common cause with
employees of other companies. The policy that employees should be
free to engage in secondary pressure was largely replaced by a policy
against the spread of industrial disputes.1' Most traditional forms
121130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942).
122 Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 1170 (1941).
=23 130 F.2d at 505-06 (citations omitted).
124 See H.R. RP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) in 1 LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 292 (1948).
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of secondary pressure were declared unfair labor practices by the addi-
tions of sections 8(b) (4) "' and 8(e) 126 and hence are unprotected.
The refusal of employees to cross a primary picket line at another
employer's premises in the course of their work is not prohibited by
section 8(b) (4).127 The Board has held that this is protected activity
125Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §8(b), 61 Stat. 141
(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1964) :
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed
by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce
to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-
(A) forcing or requiring any employer . . . to enter into any
agreement . . . prohibited by [§ 8(e) ] ...
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize
or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his em-
ployees unless such labor organization has been certified as the repre-
sentative of such employees under the provisions of [§ 9] ...
126 National Labor Relations Act § 8(e), added by, 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(e) (1964).(e) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and
any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from
handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the
products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter
containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and
void ....
127There is a proviso to § 8(b) which states:
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed
to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any
employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer
are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such
employees whom such employer is required to recognize under this [act] ...
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b), 61 Stat. 141 (1947),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1964).
The purpose of this proviso was largely to make clear that refusals to cross picket
lines are not the type of secondary pressure covered by § 8(b) (4). See, e.g., 73
CONG. RFc. 6859 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft) in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1623 (1948). It is possible to read
the proviso as implying that all refusals which do not come within its terms violate
§ 8(b) (4). This would be an unfortunate interpretation and contrary to the scheme
of the amendment, which was to distinguish the spread of industrial disputes through
secondary strikes from the indirect secondary pressure brought about by refusals to
cross picket lines.
As Judge Prettyman stated in Seafarers Union v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585, 591
(D.C. Cir. 1959) :
No matter how great the pressure on a neutral employer may be when
somebody else's place of business is picketed, it is essentially different from
the pressure such a neutral feels when his own business is being picketed.
This . . . is the rationale which must govern the interpretation of § 8(b) (4).
In Truck Drivers Union (Patton Warehouse), 140 N.L.R.B. 1474 (1963), the Board
concluded that an agreement by which an employer agreed not to punish an employee
for refusing to cross a picket line violated § 8(e), insofar as it went beyond the pro-
viso to § 8(b) (4). Implicit in the Board's decision is the conclusion that such refusals
are unprotected activity and probably themselves violate § 8(b) (4). The Board's
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because it comes within the literal meaning of section 7.128 It is
activity for mutual aid or protection of another union and is concerted
activity, even when undertaken by an individual employee on his
own.'29 By definition, the employee who honors a picket line does
not act alone. He is in concert of action with the pickets. There is
no reason why the policy of permitting employees to make common
cause with each other is any less applicable when a single employee
honors a picket line than when two employees together do so.
conclusion in this regard based on the statutory langauge and legislative history was
set aside in Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 916 (1964). The Court held that the refusal to cross any lawful primary
picket line was protected and an agreement not to punish for it was lawful under
§ 8(e). Both the Board and the courts relied heavily on the legislative history of
the 1947 and 1959 amendments in order to support their conclusion. The best that
can be said is that the legislative history is inconclusive. Most of the comments cited
were individual opinions directed to other questions.
It is fairly clear that Congress did not really direct itself to whether § 8(b) (4)
covered refusals outside the proviso. Indeed, for these reasons, legislative history
is of only minor value in solving any of the questions concerning the protected status
of refusals to cross. However, the scheme of the act, as Judge Prettyman pointed
out, supports the conclusion that only refusals related to secondary strikes or induce-
ments at the employer's own premises run afoul of § 8(b) (4). There is no doubt
that employees who honor a lawful picket line at their own employer's premises are
engaged in protected activity. See NLRB v. John S. Swift Co., 277 F.2d 641, 646
(7th Cir. 1960); Cooper Thermometer Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 502 (1965). In a recent
case the Board and the courts agreed that the proviso did not protect refusals to
cross unlawful picket lines. Any attempt to provide that such refusals will not be
punished violates § 8(e). See Drivers Union 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547 (1966).
128 The Board's analysis of this issue in Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B.
1545 (1962), petition to set aside denied sub norn. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325
F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964), is astonishingly brief:
Such activity is literally for "mutual aid or protection," as well as to
assist a labor organization, within the meaning of Section 7. Contrary to the
language of the Board's former decision, therefore, we find that the employees
of Redwing engaged in protected concerted activity when they refused to
cross the Virginia-Carolina picket line.
137 N.L.R.B. at 1546-47.
129 Read literally, the term "concerted" suggests that two or more employees
must take part in the activity and possibly even that they must be conscious of working
together. There is one case in which a court adopted this position. In NLRB v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951), the
court held that the decision made by individual employees to honor a picket line was
not protected by § 7 because the employees were each acting individually. "There is
no evidence that these eight employees acted in combination or concert." Id. at 127.
Subsequent cases have not accepted this interpretation of § 7, and it is well settled
that concerted activity may be undertaken by an individual employee. So long as
the employee is seeking to make common cause with others or to organize the em-
ployees or to protest general working conditions, his actions have been held to come
within § 7. See, e.g., NLRB v. Kit Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 166 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 910 (1965) ; Farmers Union Co-op. Marketing Ass'n, 145 N.L.R.B. 1
(1963). Thus, when a single employee has sought to begin union organization or
has sought to arouse his fellows in protesting working conditions, the Board and the
courts have held this to be concerted activity. NLRB v. Martin, 207 F.2d 655 (9th
Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 1945). This interpre-
tation is consistent with the basic approach of § 7 which is to permit employees to
protest and to organize. Any other interpretation of § 7 would make the first em-
ployee who seeks to begin organization or protest vulnerable to discharge until he
is able to attract support. None of the decisions dealing with refusals to cross picket
lines, including NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953), have
dealt with this question, although the analysis of the Court in Illinois Bell was strongly
urged by the respondent in the Rockaway News case. Brief for respondent, pp. 10-17,
NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
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Although the Board is correct in finding that honoring a picket
line is within the literal language of section 7, its conclusion that such
activity is protected does not automatically follow.1"' The Board ap-
parently did not consider the statutory policy which aims at preventing
the spread of labor disputes. The Board's opinion indicated that it
thought it was unnecessary to consider the interests of the neutral
employer, since he has the option of replacing the employee who
refused to cross the line.
Since, as noted above,' 3' the right to replace is limited, its existence
does not justify the Board's failure to consider the employer's interest
in determining whether the activity is protected. Thus, the Board
should have considered the desirability of holding that employees who
honor picket lines are entitled to reinstatement if they apply prior to
actually being replaced. The Board also failed to consider whether
an employer should be able to discharge employees who honor picket
lines in order to forestall similar conduct in the future from the same
employees and to deter others.
It has been argued that the employee who refuses to cross a picket
line in the course of his assigned work should be treated no differently
than an employee who, contrary to company rules, engages in union
solicitation during working hours. Although union solicitation is
normally protected by section 7, this protection is subordinated to the
employer's right to insist that working time be spent in accordance
with his instructions. Employees who solicit for a union during
working hours may be discharged with no right of reinstatement. 32
Union organization is a more significant right than the right to make
common cause with other employees. Since activity designed to
achieve union organization is subordinated to the employer's interest
in having work done as he requests, there is no reason for treating
differently refusals to work because of a picket line. Although the
Seventh Circuit in Everist did not specifically decide that honoring a
picket line is unprotected activity, the court's opinion indicated that
it would view such arguments with favor. 3 3
130 There are many examples of this phenomenon given throughout this article
in Parts II, III and IV. One closely in point is the conclusion that union solicitation
in violation of a valid no-solicitation rule is not protected activity. Such activity
meets the literal language of § 7, but it is held unprotected because of the employer's
interest in having his work done when he requests. See, e.g., Delta Sportswear, Inc.,
160 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (Aug. 5, 1966).
131 See text accompanying notes 41-67 supra.
.32 NLRB v. USW, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
133 "Such refusal was no more and no less than a refusal to work, a violation of
their contract to continue hauling for which they could be and were validly discharged."
334 F.2d at 317-18. The refusal to cross a picket line may also be analogized to a
partial work stoppage. Partial work stoppages or slowdowns are sometimes held
unprotected. See text accompanying notes 152-77 infra. For reasons there indicated,
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However the Board's conclusion can be convincingly supported.
The analogy to no-solicitation cases is misleading because rules limit-
ing solicitations are premised on the assumption that adequate oppor-
tunity exists for solicitation during non-working time.134 If there is to
be a right to honor picket lines, it must be exercisable during working
hours. It should also be noted that with respect to solicitation rules,
the employer's economic interest cannot be protected by the right to
replace.
The NLRA defines "labor dispute" quite broadly, to include
almost any possible labor objective, "regardless of whether the dis-
putants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 135
The term is used only in section 2(3) which defines the term employee
to "include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of,
or in connection with, any current labor dispute." "36 The impact of
the two sections is to make clear that an employee who quits work
because of a labor dispute involving employees of another employer
cannot be treated as one who has given up his job and his protection
under the statute by refusing to work. As Judge Hand pointed out in
the Peter Cailler Kohler Co. case, it was generally understood that
the Wagner Act protected economic pressure in support of the em-
ployees of another employer.' There is nothing to suggest that the
Taft-Hartley or Landrum-Griffin amendments removed that protection
from refusals to cross picket lines.
Sections 8(b) (4) and 8(e) represent a hard fought, carefully
hammered-out compromise. Their provisions indicate the limits to
I believe such partial work stoppages should almost always be held protected. In any
case, the theory by which such stoppages are held unprotected is primarily their
serious impact on the employer. See UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.
(Briggs & Stratton), 336 U.S. 245 (1949). The typical partial work stoppage involves
an effort to maximize the degree of economic hardship caused the employer. Refusals
to cross picket lines are generally not efforts to harm the employer except as necessary
to help other employees. Therefore, such cases do not come within the reasons which
led the Supreme Court to indicate that in some situations the use of intermittent
work stoppages is unprotected. Where partial work stoppages do not involve serious
economic dislocation, they are generally held protected. See NLRB v. Solo Cup Co.,
237 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1956) ; NLRB v. J. I. Case Co., 198 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 917 (1953).
'34 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Stoddard-Quirk
Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962).
135 National Labor Relations Act § 2(9), as amended, 61 Stat 138 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 152(9) (1964).
136 National Labor Relations Act §2(3), as amended, 61 Stat 137 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
137 See also Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. NLRB, 111 F.2d 869, 873-74
(7th Cir. 1940); Cyril de Cordova & Bro., 91 N.L.R.B. 1121 (1950). The Taft-
Hartley Act debates indicated the belief of Congress that secondary economic pressure,
as well as refusals to cross picket lines, were protected activity under the Wagner
Act. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) in 1 LEGISIATivE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 297 (1948) ; S. MINORITY REP.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 463, 481-82 (1948).
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which Congress was willing to restrict the policy of permitting em-
ployees to make common cause with each other.3 Although there
were efforts to limit the scope of section 7 prior to the 1947 amend-
ments, at no time did these efforts attempt to remove the protection
of section 7 from refusals to cross picket lines. 3" There was con-
siderable Congressional concern that the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-
Griffin amendments not interfere with the ability of employees to
engage in traditional activity.4 ° In several places the statutory lan-
guage reflects this concern. 4 ' Refusals to cross picket lines have long
been considered an integral part of primary strike activity. 42 Accord-
ingly, it would be inconsistent with the language of the statute and
the understanding of its sponsors to hold that section 8(b) (4) limited
138 See S. MINORITY REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 463, 481-82 (1948). Thus
Senator Taft in his discussion of §8(b)(1) (A) explained one of its purposes as
leaving it up to the employees to determine whether "to participate in a strike or a
picket line." 93 CONG. REc. 6859 (1947) in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 1623 (1948). "Section 13 has been amended
* . . (1) By a clause which makes clear that the Wagner Act has diminished the
right to strike only to the extent specifically provided by the new amendments to the
act .... ." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Act, 1947, at 434 (1948). Senator Kennedy,
in a report on the Conference which agreed on the 1959 amendments, stated, "We have
protected the right of employees of a secondary employer, in the case of a primary
strike, to refuse to cross a primary strike picket line." 105 CONG. REc. 16255 (1959)
in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
Act OF 1959, at 1389 (1959). See remarks to the same effect by Senator Douglas, 105
CONG. REC. A8372 in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING
AND DISCLOSuRE AcT OF 1959, at 1834.
139 H.R. 3020 as originally reported provided that § 7 did not protect unfair labor
practices under § 8(b) "unlawful concerted activities" under a new § 12, and violations
of collective bargaining agreements. The language of § 12 and its legislative his-
tory indicate the type of changes in § 7 which Congress considered making. They
were concerned with unlawful and clearly improper tactics. The type of im-
proper tactics mentioned, such as sitdown strikes, were much different from re-
fusals to cross a picket line. See H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947)
in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 505.
See also id. at 49, 80, 176, 207, 318, 355 (remarks of individual Congressmen).
Eventually, however, this language was left out, as were the categories of unlawful
concerted activities, and § 7 remained essentially the same.
140 See the discussion in note 138 .sipra. For an accurate history of the efforts
to make certain that the 1959 amendments did not make refusals to cross a picket line
unlawful, see the discussion in Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539, 543-45
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964).
141 In addition to the proviso to § 8(b) quoted above, there is a proviso to
§ 8(b) (4) (B) which provides that "nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be
construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or
primary picketing . . . ." Most significantly § 13 provides:
Nothing in this subchapter except as specifically provided for herein, shall
be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualification on that right.
National Labor Relations Act § 13, as amended, 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163
(1964).
142 See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 687 (1951), in
which the Court described the effort to influence employees not to cross a primary
picket line as "no more than was traditional and permissible in a primary strike."
See also Printing Specialties Union v. Le Baron, 171 F.2d 331, 334 (9th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 949 (1949).
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the reach of section 7 with respect to employees who refuse to cross
picket lines. Moreover, if honoring a picket line is held unprotected,
there is bound to be a deterrent effect on other, less controversial
union activity. The employer has shown himself to be willing to
retaliate against the union and the number of strong union adherents
has been reduced. Thus the Board's position is tenable. The reasons
in favor of it are at least as strong as those opposed, and there is no
reason why it should be overturned.
Honoring Unlawful Picket Lines
Until recently, it has been accepted without discussion or analysis
that a refusal to cross a picket line is protected only where the picket
line itself is lawful." 3 The reasons for such a rule are not readily
apparent. It cannot be justified in terms of the interests of the
employer who, according to the rule, may legitimately discharge the
employee. The discharging employer is likely to be acting from one
of three motives: to get the job done; to deter similar conduct in the
future; to express his displeasure with union activity. The first
motive is proper whether the activity is protected or not, and the
illegal nature of the picket line is likely to be irrelevant to the
other two.
Where an employer punishes an employee for honoring a picket
line because of his displeasure with union activity, it would be far-
fetched to assume that his displeasure is related to the unlawfulness of
the picket line. In such cases the employer is motivated by a desire to
punish an employee for demonstrating solidarity with other employees.
This motive is in conflict with the basic policies of the act and with the
principles which underlie section 7. Similarly, an employer who acts
in order to deter is likely to want to deter his employees from honoring
any picket lines. Indeed, at the time he acts, he will probably not
know whether the picket line is lawful or not. The legality of the
picket line is likely to be a matter of indifference to the discharging
143 In Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court
held, as did the Board, that a refusal to cross a prohibited picket line "is unprotected."
The court's analysis was directed primarily to the question of whether refusal to
cross a secondary picket line called by a recognized union was protected. The court
based its conclusion on the basis of the legislative history of both the proviso to
§ 8(b) and the 1959 amendments which indicated that Congress was concerned with
protecting refusals to cross "primary picket lines" or a "legitimate strike picket line."
The legislative history which the court cites is too fragmentary to be very meaningful.
At most, it indicates that Congress was concerned with the legality of refusals to
cross primary lawful picket lines. Id. at 550-51. There is no indication that Con-
gress, in any sense, addressed itself to the question of refusals to cross unlawful picket
lines. The language of the act is broad enough to protect such refusals if the Board
or a court concludes that such protection would be consistent with the policies of
the NLRA.
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employer, and so it seems unfortunate that the determination of un-
lawfulness months later may decide the legality of his conduct.
Moreover, whatever the employer's motive is in discharging
employees for honoring an illegal picket line, his action is likely to
deter employees from honoring any picket line in the future. Selective
deterrence is only possible if employees are capable of distinguishing
between lawful and unlawful picket lines. Anyone familiar with the
realities of industrial strife and the behavior of employees faced with
a picket line would agree that employees are not likely to attempt such
a distinction; anyone familiar with the law concerning the legality of
picket lines would consider it a cruel task to require of them. This
is an issue with which the Board and the courts have wrestled con-
tinually and have failed to resolve with consistency. 144  The danger of
replacement provides a great inducement to employees to cross picket
lines. It, therefore, takes a commitment and a strong sense of union
solidarity for an employee to refuse to cross a picket line. The feeling
which will permit employees to run such a risk can only be maintained
by developing a sense of the importance of picket lines, and creating a
feeling of shame and betrayal in employees who cross them. To the
extent that the selective crossing of picket lines is encouraged, the
feeling of solidarity is undermined. 45
144 With respect to the legality of organizational picketing, see Meltzer, Organi-
zational Picketing and the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 30 U. Car. L. REv. 78 (1962).
For some idea of the difficulties involved in determining the legality of secondary activ-
ity, see NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58 (1964); NLRB v. Amal-
gamated Lithographers, 309 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
1n Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court argues that
the problems of determining legality are not great enough to warrant holding the
refusals to be protected. "However, recent decisions promise clarification. Moreover,
employees and employer will generally be advised by counsel and will not have to
rely on their own judgment." Id. at 551. The court's optimistic appraisal of the
trend of the cases is a matter difficult to refute without another article. It might be
sufficient to state that after several years with the NLRB and several years teaching
labor law, the author would not like to be faced with the problem. It is probably
significant that Judge Bazelon limited his praise of the recent cases to a future
"promise" of clarification. The judge's comment that employees will generally be
"advised by counsel" is wrong. Rarely are employees able to call upon counsel. Indeed,
at a recent International Executive Board meeting of the United Steel Workers of
America, a proposal to permit local unions to retain counsel was rejected. See Steel
Labor, Feb. 1967, p. 4. Futhermore, even if local counsel were available, it would
often be difficult to tell in advance when advice about the legality of another union's
picket line was necessary. Of course, if it were established that the employee who
honored the picket line knew of its illegality, it would be proper to hold the refusal
unprotected. But such cases are not likely to arise often.
145 "From the point of view of union morality, a good union man never crosses
a picket line no matter whose picket line." BARBASH, LABOR UNIONS IN AcTION 129
(1948). The explanation for the rule may be that it serves to diminish the effective-
ness of unlawful picket lines and that this result justifies the impact on lawful picket
lines and the risk to the employees. However, if a peaceful picket line is unlawful
at all, it is generally unlawful by virtue of §§ 8(b) (7) or 8(b) (4). It is possible to
get speedy injunctive relief if either section is violated, and a violation of § 8(b) (4)
makes a union liable in damages. If a picket line is unlawful because it is violent, in-
junctive relief is also available. Under both §§ 8(b) (4) and 8(b) (7), the burden is
sometimes put on the picketing employees to see to it that their picket line is not hon-
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III. LIMITATIONS BASED ON THE NATURE OF THE
ECONOMIC PRESSURE
If read literally, the term "concerted activity" would encompass
almost all economic pressure applied by two or more employees.146
However, as is true with respect to practically all of the broad lan-
guage of the act, its meaning has been limited by other recognized
policies. Thus, violence, threats of violence, efforts to seize or
destroy company property 147 and conduct which violates the policy
of other federal statutes 148 are all unprotected activities. 49 As to
these there is little or no theoretical dispute. The only important
questions concern the degree of misconduct necessary to make conduct
unprotected. 50 It is only slightly less apparent that strikes in breach
ored at the risk of its becoming unlawful and subject to being enjoined. This would
seem to be the proper way to handle this problem. If it is deemed wasteful to society
to have employees honor certain picket lines, the burden should be put on the striking
employees and the law should attempt to encourage them to limit the effectiveness of
the picket line. Thus the rule that picket lines must be lawful to make honoring
them protected is not needed to cope with problems arising under §§ 8(b) (4), 8(b) (7)
or strikes involving violence. The justification for the rule would then have to be
made by reference to its impact on strikes which violate § 8(b) (3). All of these
are likely to involve highly technical questions and do not justify permitting an em-
ployer to discharge his employee for reasons which have nothing to do with the issue
on which the legality of the strike will turn.
146As already noted, an individual may engage in concerted activity within the
meaning of § 7. See note 129 sipra.
147 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255 (1939) ; NLRB v.
Indiana Desk Co., 149 F.2d 987, 995 (7th Cir. 1945); NLRB v. Clinchfield Coal
Corp., 145 F.2d 66, 73 (4th Cir. 1944).
148 Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942); NLRB v. Indiana Desk
Co., mipra note 147.
149W. T. Rawleigh v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 832, 839-40 (7th Cir. 1951); NLRB v.
Perfect Circle Co., 162 F.2d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 1947).
150 Where employer unfair labor practices cause a strike, the Board is less
likely to find that minor misconduct made the strike activity unprotected. See, e.g.,
John Kinkel & Sons, 157 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (March 16, 1966); Golay & Co. (Lee
Cylinder Division), 156 N.L.R.B. 1252, enforcecd 371 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1966);
Louisiana Mfg. Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 1301 (1965); Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse
Co., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 248 (1965), enforced 369 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966). More-
over, even if the activity is unprotected, the employee may be ordered reinstated in
order to remedy the original unfair labor practice. See NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213
F.2d 748 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954) ; Oneita Knitting Mills, Inc.,
153 N.L.R.B. 51 (1965). Even where the employer's conduct is blameless, the Board
may conclude that minor non-violent misconduct which occurred as part of a general
course of protected activity did not make an employee liable to discharge. Thus, an
employee who became angered in discussing the company's wage offer and called
the employer a liar was held to have engaged in protected activity. The Bettcher
Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 526 (1948). The stated standard by which the Board hasjudged such cases is whether the misconduct is so severe as to "render the employee
unfit for further service." Id. at 527. It has been applied in a variety of situations.
The Board has held the following activity protected: drawing cartoons of the boss
to protest a low wage and posting them on the bulletin board, Buehler Corp. (Indiana
Gear Works Div.), 156 N.L.R.B. 397 (1965), enforcement denied, 371 F.2d 273 (7th
Cir. 1967); taking company cards which the employees objected to signing, Laney
& Duke Storage Warehouse Co., supra; interrupting a company meeting to talk on
behalf of the union, Leece-Neville Co., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 29 (June 14, 1966) ; calling
the employer a "social clod," Dr. J. C. Campbell, Dentist, 157 N.L.R.B. No. 87
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of a no-strike clause should be unprotected since such strikes conflict
with the federal policy favoring the establishment of orderly procedures
for resolving disputes in an established bargaining relationship.'51
Considerable confusion exists, however, concerning the extent
to which unorthodox pressure tactics-neither violent nor unlawful-
may be held unprotected in circumstances in which traditional forms
of economic pressure would be held protected. In some of its early
decisions construing the reach of section 7, the Supreme Court held
unorthodox activity unprotected. In its more recent decisions, how-
ever, the Court has apparently rejected the concept of picking and
choosing among lawful economic weapons. It has also indicated a
willingness to read section 7 more broadly. As a result, the continued
vitality of the older cases is subject to question. A brief review of the
cases indicates the nature of the conflict between the older and more
recent decisions.
The first case in which the Court held the use of otherwise lawful
but unorthodox economic pressure unprotected was UA W v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd. (Briggs & Stratton).152 In support of its
bargaining demands, the union called a series of intermittent work
stoppages in the guise of union meetings to disrupt the employer's
production and delivery schedule. The Court held that such activity
was unprotected by section 7. Distinguishing this conduct from a
total strike, the Court held that it constituted an improper bargaining
weapon. The conclusion of impropriety was supported by three con-
siderations: 1) it is unfair to draw pay from a man while applying
pressure against him; -' 2) such conduct is much more effective than
(March 23, 1966). The standard is at its best a vague one. It is not easy to deter-
mine when misconduct brands an employee as "unfit for further service." Why
should an employee who throws rocks through a window or who seizes a machine
be more unfit than an employee who ridicules his boss? It is not necessarily true that
"serious" misconduct is more likely to be repeated or that it will necessarily be more
offensive to the employer.
The fact is, there is no necessary connection between the seriousness of the offense
and potential impact on future service. The Board is probably not making an
estimate as to future impact, but rather, an evaluation of how improper the conduct
was and how much damage it caused. If one were to try to estimate future impact,
one might well consider that name calling can be more coercive than physical abuse.
But, even if the Board's standard is unclear, its approach is understandable. Labor
disputes are likely to be emotionally laden and a certain amount of misconduct must
be tolerated so that employees will feel free to exercise the rights granted them. On
the other hand, where minor misconduct is involved, the Board is more likely to find
that the activity was not for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. See, e.g., Karat,
Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 39 (Dec. 23, 1966); Continental Mfg. Corp., 155 N.L.R.B.
255 (1965). The courts show a similar tendency. See Indiana Gear Works v.
NLRB, 371 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1967).
151 NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
152 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
1 5 3 Id. at 257. The Court cited with approval C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108
F.2d 390, 397 (7th Cir. 1939) in which the 7th Circuit used the axiom that one could
not "be on a strike and at work simultaneously" in order to hold similar tactics un-
protected.
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a total strike, since the employer is helpless to protect himself against
it; ""I and 3) the employer was not given adequate notice of how
he could respond to prevent or to stop the activity. 1
55
The proposition that certain lawful techniques are improper and
hence, unprotected was more fully articulated in NLRB v. Local
No. 1229 I.B.E.W. (Jefferson Standard).' The case arose in the
context of bargaining negotiations between the Jefferson Standard
Radio Station and the union. During their own time, a group of
technicians, not on strike, distributed leaflets which attacked the quality
of the company's broadcast operations. The employer discharged
these employees, and the Board sustained the discharge on the ground
that the conduct was "indefensible" (a word which the Board plucked
from the court's opinion in Briggs & Stratton). The court of appeals
reversed, stating that so long as the object was legitimate and the
means lawful, the Board could not declare the conduct in question to
be unprotected. 5' The court properly pointed out that on several
occasions the Board had found activity to be protected which might be
classified as disloyal or disobedient. The Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals, holding that the conduct involved was disloyal, that
disloyalty constitutes "cause" and that, therefore, the conduct was
unprotected.
Section 10(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act expressly pro-
vides that "No order of the Board shall require the reinstate-
ment of any individual as an employee who has been sus-
pended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay,
if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause."
There is no more elemental cause for discharge of an em-
ployee than disloyalty to his employer...
Congress, while safeguarding, in § 7, the right of
employees to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,"
did not weaken the underlying contractual bonds and loyalties
of employer and employee. 5'
For some time the Board and the courts largely followed the
language of Jefferson Standard,'59 and held that concerted activity was
15 336 U.S. at 264.
155 Id. at 249. The conclusion that activity which is unprotected and unprohibited
by the federal act can always be regulated by the states has since been rejected by
the Court. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245-48 (1959).
156346 U.S. 464 (1953).
157 202 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
158 346 U.S. at 472-73. This drew a strong dissent from Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
Id. at 478-81.
15 John S. Swift Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 394 (1959), enforced, 277 F.2d 641 (7th
Cir. 1960) ; Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1956) ; Honolulu Rapid Transit
Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1806 (1954).
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unprotected so long as it was not a conventional strike and could be
characterized in such a way as to suggest a legitimate basis for dis-
charge. Since so much union activity could be characterized as dis-
obedient or insubordinate, this method of analysis could not endure
for long.
The Supreme Court rejected the position that "cause" necessarily
operates as a limitation on section 7 in NLRB v. Washington
Aluminum Co.' In that case, seven employees were discharged after
they left work, without permission, to protest the extreme cold in the
machine shop. Although such conduct constituted a violation of a
company rule and could have been characterized as "cause," the Court
held that the policy of section 7 outweighed employer interests and
limited the concept of "cause" to instances of violence, physical inter-
ference, unlawful conduct, breach of contract and disloyalty.'"' Hold-
ing the activity protected, the Court stated:
Section 10(c) of the Act does authorize an employer
to discharge employees for "cause" and our cases have long
recognized this right on the part of an employer. But this,
of course, cannot mean that an employer is at liberty to
punish a man by discharging him for engaging in concerted
activities which § 7 of the Act protects. And the plant rule in
question here purports to permit the company to do just that
for it would prohibit even the most plainly protected kinds
of concerted work stoppages until and unless the permission
of the company's foreman was obtained.
It is of course true that § 7 does not protect all concerted
activities, but that aspect of the section is not involved in this
case. The activities engaged in here do not fall within the
normal categories of unprotected concerted activities such as
those that are unlawful, violent or in breach of contract. Nor
can they be brought under this Court's more recent pro-
nouncement which denied the protection of § 7 to activities
characterized as "indefensible" because they were there found
to show a disloyalty to the workers' employer which this
Court deemed unnecessary to carry on the workers' legitimate
concerted activities. The activities of these seven employees
cannot be classified as "indefensible" by any recognized
standard of conduct. 62
It is noteworthy that the Court did not cite Briggs & Stratton in
its opinion in Washington Aluminum. The Court had in the mean-
time dealt with the type of conduct involved in Briggs & Stratton in
160 370 U.s. 9, 16-17 (1962).
101 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
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a slightly different context. In NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union
the Supreme Court held that the use of intermittent economic pressure
by a union during bargaining negotiations does not violate the union's
duty to bargain under section 8(b) (3)." While the Court was will-
ing to "agree arguendo" that the activity was unprotected by virtue of
the "decision in the Briggs & Stratton case," the force of its reasoning
suggests that the use of such pressure tactics does not violate the
standards later set forth in Washington Aluminum. In Insurance
Agents', the Court described the use of the economic pressure involved
as "part and parcel" of the system of collective bargaining contemplated
by the labor act, and denied to the Board the power to "introduce
some standard of properly 'balanced' bargaining power, or some new
distinction of justifiable and unjustifiable, proper and 'abusive' eco-
nomic weapons . . . ." ' It is hard to see how conduct can be
simultaneously within the scheme of bargaining sanctioned by the
act and "indefensible." It is also hard to see why the Board is denied
the power to "pick and choose" among economic weapons for pur-
poses of section 8(b) (3), while it is granted that power for purposes
of section 7. If the one is an unwarranted intrusion on collective
bargaining, then the other must be as well. As the Court stated:
"We see no indication here that Congress has put it to the Board
to define through its processes what economic sanctions might be
permitted negotiating parties in an 'ideal' or 'balanced' state of col-
lective bargaining." "65 In its recent opinions broadening the em-
ployer's ability to utilize the lockout as a bargaining weapon, the
Court reaffirmed its denial of the Board's claimed power to pick and
choose among the economic weapons available in bargaining
situations. 6'
It might be argued that the Court's reasoning can be used
to justify the opposite conclusion. The effect of holding activity to
be protected is to limit the employer's ability to respond. The use
of economic force is most free when activity is not protected and not
unlawful. In such cases the Board is unavailable as a referee. The
issue is then won by the side with the greatest economic power.
This argument applies with equal force to all concerted activity. It
has no special relevance to intermittent work stoppages and it is
163 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
164Id. at 497.
165 Id. at 499-500.
166 Sections 8(a) (1) and (3) do not give the Board a general authority to
assess the relative economic power of the adversaries in the bargaining
process and to deny weapons to one party or the other because of the assess-
ment of that party's bargaining power.
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965); accord, NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 283 (1965).
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irrelevant to the determination of whether particular conduct may be
described as indefensible. If it is thought desirable to permit em-
ployers to respond to economic pressure, it would be better to hold
the response lawful rather than the activity unprotected. Moreover,
even if the evaluation of economic weapons which is improper in
applying sections 8(b) (3) and 8(a) (5) were proper in determining
the reach of section 7, the reasons given by Mr. Justice Jackson to
support the holding in the Briggs & Stratton case would not support
the conclusion that intermittent work stoppages should be held un-
protected. It is no longer true, if it ever were true, that an employer
is helpless in the face of such bargaining tactics. As noted above, the
employer's ability to use economic pressure has been increased. Not
only may he replace the employees involved, but he is free to lock them
out or subcontract the work they have been doing. At the time of the
Briggs & Stratton decision, this was not clear. A bargaining lockout,
in particular, would seem to be an appropriate defensive measure against
the unique aspects of the pressure used in Briggs & Stratton-em-
ployees attacking the employer at the same time they continued to
draw pay.1"7 So long as the employer may, in effect, choose to turn
the conduct into a total strike, there is no reason why it should be
held unprotected because it is different than a total strike. In view
of the approach taken and the legal situation created by its recent
decisions, the Court should, if the occasion is presented, overrule the
holding in the Briggs & Stratton case. 68
The determination that unorthodox forms of economic pressure
during bargaining negotiations are protected would not necessarily
167 Even before the decision in American Ship Building, which permitted an
employer to use the lockout as an offensive bargaining weapon, it was accepted
that a lockout was a legitimate response in order to protect against particularly
effective employee pressure. See Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 785 (1964) ;
H. H. Zimmerli, 133 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1961); Associated General Contractors, 105
N.L.R.B. 767 (1953). In NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965), it was held that
replacements could be hired and operations continued as long as the "continued
operations . . . were wholly consistent with a legitimate business purpose." Id.
at 285.
The position announced in C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390, 397 (7th
Cir. 1939), that employees cannot "be on strike and at work simultaneously" is
either tautological or a statement of conclusion. See also Home Beneficial Life Ins.
Co. v. NLRB, 159 F.2d 280 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 758 (1947). The
statement in the Conn case does not explain why or when forms of economic
pressure short of a total strike should be held unprotected. In many instances,
lesser forms of economic pressure have been permitted. See, e.g., NLRB v. J. I.
Case Co., 198 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 917 (1953) ; Edir,
Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (June 20, 1966).
168As noted above, the fact that no previous demand has been made of the em-
ployer was a factor in the Briggs & Stratton decision. However, the Court in
Washington Alninium specifically held that a previous demand was not essential
for the use of economic pressure to be protected. "The language of section 7 is
broad enough to protect concerted activities whether they take place before, after,
or at the same time such a demand is made." 370 U.S. at 14.
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mean that such pressures are protected under all other circumstances.
During the life of an agreement, the use of any economic pressure is
almost always unprotected because of the presence of grievance ma-
chinery. The question is closer when unorthodox economic pressure
is used to protest specific employer conduct where there is no estab-
lished grievance machinery. Some of the cases holding unorthodox
economic pressure unprotected involve protests by unorganized em-
ployees or employees in the process of being organized.169 It is not
uncommon for employees in such situations to use unorthodox tactics
short of a total strike. In Washington Aluminum, the Supreme Court
indicated that considerable leeway would be granted to unorganized
employees.' This approach is sound since the use of economic pres-
sure by unorganized employees is generally part of the process of
organization. In such situations, the use of economic pressure is
rarely prolonged, although it is often disorderly and unorthodox.'
Where union organization is in progress, economic pressure is likely
to be, in part, a protest against working conditions and a manifestation
of support for the organizing union, even if employed primarily to
protest specific employer conduct." 2 To permit an employer to dis-
charge the employees involved in such cases would have a serious
coercive impact on employee freedom of choice.' Logically, there is
no reason why any partial work stoppages should be held unprotected
where a total strike is permissible, so long as the employer may, by
use of the lockout, choose to treat the employees as being on strike.
This would mean the employees involved could be laid off and
replacements hired, unless they agree to return to work and to accept
the employer's action in the matter in dispute without resort to
further economic pressure. The only difficulty with this solution is
that employers in unorganized plants might not know of the rules,
since they probably do not employ experienced labor counsel. It
would be inappropriate to require such an employer, faced with inter-
mittent economic pressure over a long period of time, to follow
169 See NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965); NLRB v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F._d 486 (8th Cir. 1946); NLRB v. Mt. Clemens
Pottery Co., 147 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1945).
170 "The seven employees here were part of a small group of employees who
were wholly unorganized. They had no bargaining representative and, in fact, no
representative of any kind to present their grievances to their employer. Under these
circumstances, they had to speak for themselves as best they could." 370 U.S. at 14.
171 See, e.g., NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965); NLRB v.
J. I. Case Co., 198 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.,
147 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1945). See discussion in text accompanying notes 96-101
supra and cases cited therein.
172 In addition to cases cited in note 171 supra, see NLRB v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946) ; C. G. Conn, Ltd., 108 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939).
173 See text following note 101 mipra.
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precisely the steps suggested above in all cases. Where particular
grievances are involved, the use of economic pressure is a particularly
costly way of settling a problem. If, for example, the employer in-
dicates a willingness to settle the matter through negotiation, the
legitimate interests of the employees can be advanced without the
economic disruption involved in the use of economic pressure." 4 In
such cases, an employer, in order to protect his business, should be
able to discharge employees who engage in continuous or extremely
disruptive pressure tactics. In non-bargaining situations, all un-
orthodox pressure should not automatically be protected whenever a
total strike would be protected. In deciding whether the activity is
protected, the Board should look to the general state of employer-
employee relations, including such factors as whether union organiza-
tion is involved, whether the particular issue indicates general dis-
satisfaction with working conditions, the nature of the demand being
made of the employer, the economic result of the tactics used, the
availability of alternative means for the employees to present their
grievance and the likely impact on future organization of holding the
activity unprotected.
The current status of the Jefferson Standard case is also unclear.
The Court in Washington Aluminum sought to distinguish it on the
ground that it involved disloyalty to the worker's employer, which
the Court deemed unnecessary to carry on the workers' legitimate
concerted activities."7 Any suggestion that the legitimacy of con-
certed activity turns on the necessity for the activity is inconsistent
with the refusal of the Court in Washington Aluminum to consider
whether the walkout there was necessary.
Disloyalty cannot serve as a basis for distinguishing the cases.
It is fairly clear that in a very real sense almost all types of economic
pressure are disloyal, in that they seek to hurt the employer's busi-
ness; a strike is always most effective if done at a time when the
workers are most needed by the employer. Moreover, it has been
argued that the very organization of a union is disloyal. If "dis-
loyalty" is to be used as a basis for explaining Jefferson Standard,
the word must be read, in the context of the case, to refer to an
attack on the employer which is not directly related to his labor
policy-an attack intended to bring him into disrepute for reasons
other than his labor policy. In its opinion, the Court stressed the
174 In NLRB v. Condenser Corp., 128 F.2d 67 (3rd Cir. 1942), the court held
that an employee could not use economic pressure during the working day when the
employer had agreed to negotiate with the employees as a group at the end of the
day.
.75 370 U.S. at 17.
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fact that the leaflets in no way indicated the existence of a labor
dispute .1 7  Since the Court offered no explanation, one can only
speculate as to why such an attack is "indefensible." Possibly, the
conclusion is based on the assumption that while traditional labor
appeals to the public not to patronize are likely to lose their effectiveness
once the strike is over, attacks on the product may continue to be
effective afterwards. It might be argued that employees, being privy
to information concerning the operation of the business, are in a
position to make a more telling attack upon the employer.
The accuracy of these assumptions is questionable, as is the
primary assumption on which they must rest: namely, that the public
will not understand that the charges spring from a labor dispute and
react to them accordingly. Nor can Jefferson Standard be explained
satisfactorily in terms of the disruptive effect which such disloyalty is
likely to have upon future employer-employee relationships. It is
difficult to accept, without further evidence, the conclusion that attacks
against the product-unrelated to the employer's labor policies-are
more likely to be disruptive of future good relationships than attacks
upon the employer's labor policies. Certainly, the kinds of attacks
upon the employer for his labor policies, which have been permitted
under the act and which are recognized as commonplace in labor
disputes, are often bitter and intense. They include attacks upon
the employer's morality, the basic nature of his relationships with
people and his treatment of subordinates. In many cases such com-
ments would be more likely to lead to bad feelings than the statement
made in Jefferson Standard that the employer's programming policy was
not highly creative or imaginative. But even if one assumes that
such statements are likely to be very effective, is it possible to say
that the harm to the employer which will be caused thereby is likely
to be greater or less justifiable than the harm which will befall the
employees if they are locked out during bargaining negotiations?
Once the Court has accepted the principle that free use of economic
pressure is the keystone of collective bargaining, it becomes increas-
ingly difficult to delineate the degrees of impact which various forms
of economic pressure are likely to have upon the adversaries.
176The fortuity of the coexistence of a labor dispute affords these tech-
nicians no substantial defense. While they were also union men and leaders
in the controversy, they took pains to separate those categories. In contrast
to their claims on the picket line as to the labor controversy, their handbill
of August 24 omitted all reference to it.
346 U.S. at 476. The Board's decision in Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627
(1956), that leaflets which suggested that paint made by strike replacements might
be of lower quality than that made by strikers, does not have this justification avail-
able, and for reasons discussed infra, represents an unfortunate application of the
Jefferson Standard decision.
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It may be that the Court should not rigidly insist on pursuing a
policy which favors the free use of economic pressure. There may be
types of economic pressure which are so inconsistent with a continuing
employer-employee relationship that their use should be considered
legitimate grounds for discharge. The special kind of disloyalty in-
volved in Jefferson Standard may be one example, although, for
reasons indicated above, this is debatable.177  In any case, reevaluation
of this area would be most desirable. The Court has thus far failed
to consider the significance of its holdings with respect to sections
8(a) (1), (3) and (5) and 8(b)(3) on the reach of section 7. It
should utilize the first available opportunity to consider the impact
of its recent decisions increasing the ability of employers to use
economic pressure on its earlier holdings denying the protection of
section 7 to types of employee pressure.
IV. THE IMPACT OF RECOGNITION ON THE USE OF
ECONOMIC PRESSURE
Economic Pressure by a Labor Organization
When no collective agreement is in force, the use of economic
pressure by an incumbent union in support of its bargaining demands
is protected if the subject matter of the demand constitutes a man-
datory subject of bargaining..7 8  However, once the agreement is
negotiated, the use of economic pressure is normally unprotected.
Most collective bargaining agreements contain no-strike clauses in
which the union agrees not to use economic pressure for any purpose
during the term of the agreement. If such a pledge is not explicit, it
will be implied to cover matters which are subject to grievance
machinery.17 Moreover, it is an unfair labor practice to strike in
order to "terminate or modify" the agreement during its term.5 0
177 An informal survey of students and colleagues indicates strong support for
the Jefferson Standard decision. In many cases this support has remained unshaken
by the arguments made herein and for this reason, a more tentative conclusion has
been stated than the one originally drafted.
178 By reason of the decision in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), strikes in support of the union's position on a non-
mandatory subject may violate § 8(b) (3). See notes 90-91 supra.
179 Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); NLRB v.
Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 179 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1950); W. L. Mead Inc., 113
N.L.R.B. 1040 (1955).
180... Where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering
employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively
shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify
such contract unless the party desiring such termination or modification-
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or
lock out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period
of sixty days after . . . notice is given or until the expiration date of such
contract, whichever occurs later.
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The Supreme Court held in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,'8 '
that a strike in response to an employer unfair labor practice should
not be held to violate the no-strike clause without a "compelling ex-
pression" that the clause was meant to apply to such strikes." 2 The
decision was unfortunate because it apparently applied to any strike
in protest of any unfair labor practice. When an employer commits
a minor unfair labor practice, the ability to strike is laregly unnecessary.
A statutory remedy is always available and there is usually a remedy
available under the contract. By reading exceptions into the no-strike
clause, the Court in Mastro unnecessarily limited the possibility of
achieving industrial stability through the use of orderly procedures
in settling disputes. The Board, however, has held that the Mastro
doctrine applies only to "flagrant or serious unfair labor practices." "s
This is a sound approach. When a serious unfair labor practice
is committed, there is less possibility of obtaining adequate relief
through the Board or arbitration and, as a result, there is more
justification for striking. Moreover, whether a strike is held pro-
tected or not in such cases is largely immaterial. The Board will
order the discharged strikers reinstated as a means of remedying the
unfair labor practice which caused the strike, whether or not the
discharge of strikers is an independent unfair labor practice.' 4
There is some indication that, in rare situations, a union may
strike in support of a bargaining demand made during the life of an
agreement. The Board held in Jacobs Manufacturing Co., 5 that the
duty to bargain continues with respect to matters not referred to or
discussed during negotiations and not "contained" in the contract.
Accordingly, if the subject concerns wages, hours or other terms or
conditions of employment, and if it is not covered by a "waiver of
bargaining" clause, the union may insist that the company bargain
about it; if the contract does not contain a general no-strike clause, the
union may strike in support of its demands.
There are few reported cases of this type, probably because the
vast majority of collective bargaining agreements prohibit all strikes
during the life of the agreement. In many cases the union waives the
right to bargain over matters not contained in the agreement. Matters
Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). See Milk Drivers Local 783, 147 N.L.R.B. 264 (1964) ;
Wollet, The Duty to Bargain Over Unwritten Termns and Conditions of Employ-
ment, 36 TEXAs L. REv. 863, 873-76 (1958).
181350 U.S. 270 (1956).
i82 Id. at 279-84.
183 Arlan's Department Store Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 802 (1961).
184 See NLRB v. Golay, 371 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Thayer Co.,
213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954).
185 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951).
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not specifically dealt with are often committed to the employer under a
management prerogative clause. Thus the Jacobs case did not make
a significant change in the general rule that strikes during the term of
a collective bargaining agreement are unprotected. Moreover, Jacobs
is of doubtful value as precedent. It was decided by a sharply divided
Board-all of whose members have since been replaced."' 0 It has
been criticized by commentators as inconsistent with the understanding
of the parties as to the meaning of their agreement and as contrary
to the statutory policy of promoting industrial peace.87  Certainly the
narrow approach taken by the Board as to the scope of the collective
bargaining agreement is inconsistent with the expansive reading later
suggested .by the Supreme Court in its arbitration trilogy and other
cases stressing the significance of collective bargaining agreements in
providing industrial stability. 18
Economic Pressure by Employees Acting Independently of the Union
The use of economic pressure by employees acting independently
of the union is usually held to be unprotected. During bargaining
negotiations, any attempt by employees to bargain independently
violates the scheme of exclusive representation set forth in section 9(a)
of the act. 89 As the Supreme Court stated in Medo Photo Supply
Corp. v. NLRB: 190
That it is a violation of the essential principle of collec-
tive bargaining and an infringement of the Act for the
employer to disregard the bargaining representative by
negotiating with individual employees, whether a majority or
a minority, with respect to wages, hours, and working condi-
tions was recognized by this Court .... The statute guaran-
186There were four different opinions. Members Houston and Styles con-
cluded that § 8(d) applied only to items specifically set forth in the contract. Chairman
Herzog was willing to imply terms on the basis of the contract negotiations. Member
Reynolds took the position that a contract should be held to cover all working con-
ditions during its term. The fourth opinion by Member Murdoch never reached
the § 8(d) problem.
187 See Wollet, supra note 180, at 877. See also Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to
Bargain Collectively During the Term of an, Existing Agreement, 63 HAv. L. REv.
1097, 1110-16 (1950).
188 See in particular USW v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. 574 (1960):
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of the
parties. It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a
myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate .... The
collective agreement covers the whole employment relationship.
Id. at 578-79.
189 Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining . ...
National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), as amended, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1964). This policy is subject to a proviso discussed at text accompanying
note 201 infra.
109321 U.S. 678 (1944).
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tees to all employees the right to bargain collectively through
their chosen representatives. Bargaining carried on by the em-
ployer directly with the employees, whether a minority or
majority, who have not revoked their designation of a
bargaining agent, would be subversive of the mode of col-
lective bargaining which the statute has ordained, as the
Board, the expert body in this field, has found."9'
The Medo case held that an employer who bargained with individ-
ual employees violated section 8(a) (5). In order to prevent the em-
ployer from being faced with economic pressure to which he cannot law-
fully yield, it follows that economic pressure in support of separate
bargaining demands should be unprotected. Moreover, since the process
of collective bargaining is so intimately connected with the use of
economic pressure, independent employee pressure contrary to the
wishes of the union-even in support of the union's bargaining posi-
tion-should be treated as a form of independent bargaining and,
hence, unprotected."9 2
Indeed it has been held that any independent economic pressure
during the course of negotiations is unprotected. The leading case in
this area is NLRB v. Draper Corp.'93 In that case, a group of em-
ployees quit work briefly to protest the company's delaying tactics in
bargaining negotiations with the union. There was no evidence of a
split between the union and the men engaging in concerted activity.
The Board held this to be protected concerted activity; the court
reversed.
The employees must act through the voice of the ma-
jority or the bargaining agent chosen by the majority.
Minority groups must acquiesce in the action of the majority
and the bargaining agent they have chosen. Just as a
minority has no right to enter into separate bargaining
arrangements with the employer, so it has no right to take
independent action to interfere with the course of bargaining
which is being carried on by the duly authorized bargaining
agent chosen by the majority. 94
'91 Id. at 684.
192Cf. NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1963);
Harnischfeger Corp. v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1953).
'93 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944); accord, NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co.,
318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1963); Harnischfeger Corp. v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 575 (7th
Cir. 1953). Contra, NLRB v. R. C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1964), taking
the position that a walkout not sponsored by the union was protected because it
supported the union's position. If a strike or other use of economic pressure is aimed
at the union rather than the employer, it presents a problem similar to those where
the employer should not be forced to endure pressure about a matter with respect
to which he is essentially neutral. See Harnischfeger Corp. v. NLRB, mtpra.
194 145 F.2d at 202-03.
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For authority, the court in Draper relied on a decision holding
unprotected a strike to force an employer to bargain with a minority
union." 5 The court assumed the answer to the most difficult question
in the case-that minority activity was equivalent to a demand for
minority bargaining. Once this assumption was made, the rest of
the opinion followed naturally and the court's description of the dangers
of minority bargaining was both pertinent and persuasive. But the
policy which requires acceptance of the bargaining agent as the repre-
sentative of the employees, does not automatically rule out the possi-
bility of independent economic pressure in support of the bargaining
agent. So long as the employees are not raising separate demands
concerning wages and hours,'1 6 but seek only to support the union,
their activity is no more than unsolicited bargaining support. Indeed,
in many cases, the possibility of independent action supporting the
union demands is part of the pressure which a union uses to seek
compliance with a demand. Moreover, the court invoked a policy
aimed at protecting the status of the incumbent union for the benefit
of the employer, over the objection of the union which not only did
not express disapproval of the strike, but which filed charges in behalf
of the discharged employees. Thus much of the court's discussion
and its analogy to a minority strike for recognition was irrelevant.
The court in Draper partly premised its conclusion on what it
assumed to be the understanding of the parties. It stated:
When the union was selected by the employees and
recognized by the company as bargaining agent, it was under-
stood and agreed on all sides that bargaining with respect to
wages, hours and conditions of work would be carried on
between the union and the company in accordance with the
above quoted statutory provision, that the employees would
acquiesce in action taken by the union and that they would
not undertake independent action with respect to the matters
they. had committed to it as their authorized agency. Not
only did the company agree to bargain only with the union,
but the employees agreed to bargain only through the union.
Those who engaged in the "wild cat" strike violated this
agreement.'0 7
One may speculate as to the source of this agreement. The
court's comment that it was understood and agreed on all sides that
15 NLRB v. Brashear Freight Lines, 119 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1942).
196 Compare Plasti-Line Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1960).
197 145 F.2d at 204. The employees in the Draper case hindered their own
case by labeling their strike a "wildcat." Id. at 201. "Wildcat" is a vague concept
which is used primarily to describe strikes in breach of a no-strike clause or strikes
to which the union is opposed.
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the employees would act only through the union is mere conjecture.
There is no evidence that the court accurately described the state of
mind of the employees at the time of negotiation. The court's assump-
tion was probably meant to be normative rather than descriptive. The
feeling which permeates the opinion is that for collective bargaining
to work, and for the employer's interests to be adequately protected,
bargaining must be limited to the actual bargaining representative, and
strikes and economic pressure should also emanate from that source.
In brief, the holding in Draper rests on a concept of orderly collective
bargaining. But, a desire for orderly bargaining is a questionable
basis on which to hold economic pressure unprotected, in view of the
cases rejecting inconsistency with orderly bargaining as a standard
for holding activity unlawful under sections 8(a) (5) and 8(b) (3) .198
So long as the activity is in support of the incumbent union, it is not
inconsistent with the concept of single iepresentation set forth in
section 9(a) and the Court's decision in Medo Supply.
The court assumed in Draper that collective bargaining will work
better if the union or the bargaining committee is required to be the
sole source of pressure. This is not necessarily true. As long as the
employer knows that the union is capable of having the walkout ended,
it may well be that independent activity will enhance the prospects for
success of the collective bargaining negotiations. Indeed, the very
fact that the employees are sufficiently stirred up to take action on
their own, may suggest to both the employer and the union the
desirability of quickly concluding negotiations. Both parties may
negotiate more rapidly to prevent employee sentiment from reaching
the point where a negotiated agreement is rejected by the membership.
However, where independent bargaining pressure is employed,
the employer may not know whether or not it is opposed by the union.
In order for the company to adequately evaluate its position, it should
be able to require the union to either adopt or disavow the employees'
action. If the union does the latter, the conduct would be unprotected;
if it adopts the employee's action, the company should be able to
respond as it would to union sponsored pressure. This means that
the company may be able to shut down operations and subcontract
the work.
A similar issue is raised when a dispute arises about a substantive
issue with respect to which the union, as an institution, does not take
a position, although it does not object to the employees pursuing their
interests on their own. 9 9 In such circumstances, a case can be made
198 E.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
1'9 In NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965), two
employees were discharged for picketing during non-working hours to force the
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for holding the use of economic pressure protected if the union itself
could strike about the disputed matter. Arguably, if the union has no
objection to the action taken by the employees, their separate demand
and their use of economic pressure does not violate the scheme of
exclusive representation set forth in section 9(a). Section 9(a) is in-
tended to protect the majority choice against interference by minority
action. This policy favoring the incumbent union should not be turned
to the advantage of the employer when the union is indifferent. In-
deed, such cases should be treated as though the union has delegated
to the employees directly involved-those who feel particularly strongly
about the matter-the union's ability to use economic pressure in sup-
port of its demands. As noted above, the position that all economic
pressure must emanate from the union is based on concepts of orderly
bargaining which have been rejected by the Court in the Insurance
Agents' and American Shipbuilding cases.
However, this argument should be rejected. A union is an institu-
tion in which employee sentiment can be crystallized and expressed. If
the union adopts a position, the employer knows that he may legally
yield to the pressure and he may assume that a majority of his employees
would want to see him do so. Where concerted activity is undertaken
without support of the union, the employer has no way of knowing
whether the position advanced has substantial support among the
employees. He probably has cause to suspect that it does not, and
that granting the request would raise more problems for him than it
would solve. One of the significant functions which a union performs
is providing a forum in which employee sentiment may be expressed
and consensus reached. Consequently, it is reasonable to require an
employee who seeks to bring about a change to first direct his attention
to winning the support of his fellow employees and the union.2°°
As noted above, an employer faced with a bargaining demand
from an independent group runs the risk of committing an unfair
labor practice if he grants the demand or even if he negotiates with
employer to hire Negroes. The Board held the activity protected on the ground
that the employer's hiring policy affected working conditions. The court of appeals
affirmed this conclusion but remanded the case to the Board to consider whether the
existence of a collective bargaining relationship including a grievance procedure made
the activity non-protected. Since the Board had not considered the issue, the court's
disposition was sound. This is a difficult issue, on which a careful Board opinion
would be most helpful.
200 This principle should not be obscured by the fact that the employees in Tanner
were picketing on behalf of a highly desirable objective. NLRB v. Tanner Motor
Livery Ltd., supra note 199. In order to bring their efforts within § 7 they should
have tried to enlist the union's support. This might have led to more fruitful nego-
tiations between the union and the employees. If the union were unwilling, other legal
steps were available under federal civil rights laws. See generally SovnxN, LEGAL
RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1966).
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the employees. Even if the incumbent union could absolve the em-
ployer of the unfair labor practice charge by declaring itself neutral,
it is uncertain what action would be sufficient to establish the union's
neutral position. In order to protect the employer from being faced
with economic pressure, a response to which may be an unfair labor
practice, it should be held that unless there is official designation of
bargaining authority by the incumbent union, the independent activity
is unprotected.
It is true that the policy of exclusive representation set forth in
section 9(a) is subject to an exception in a proviso to section 9(a)
which states that
any individual employee or a group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the interven-
tion of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjust-
ment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-
bargaining contract or agreement then in effect. .
However, the decision that an employee request constitutes a
grievance within the meaning of the proviso should not mean that
independent economic pressure in support of the grievance is pro-
tected. The language of the proviso contemplates a peaceful presenta-
tion and a voluntary adjustment of grievances. Since grievances are
typically minor disputes involving only a fraction of the employees, it
would be inefficient and costly to permit the major disruption poten-
tially involved in strikes and picket lines to be used as a basis for
demanding concessions over these matters. Certainly where inter-
pretation of the collective bargaining agreement is involved, a mech-
anism generally exists for the peaceful settlement of the grievance,
either under the grievance machinery or through a suit under
section 301.2"2
The Supreme Court has held that an individual does not auto-
matically have the right to utilize the grievance machinery or section
301 on his own, if the union refuses to espouse his cause. 3 The basis
201 National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), as amended, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
202Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 61 Stat. 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). Where there is an established grievance ma-
chinery, the use of economic pressure either by a union or by individual employees
with respect to a matter subject to the grievance machinery is generally held unpro-
tected. See NLRB v. Sunset Minerals, Inc., 211 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1954); NLRB v.
Dorsey Trailer, Inc., 179 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1950).
203 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Compare Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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for that holding is a desire to enhance the status of the union as sole
bargaining representative under the act.2 The arguments in favor
of so holding cut strongly in favor of having disputes between the
employees and the employer resolved through the union, and in main-
taining a single source of employee sentiment which the employer can
rely on. It makes no sense to couple a rule premised on such policies
with a rule permitting individual employees to utilize economic pres-
sure on their own.
There are additional arguments which support the conclusion that
the use of economic pressure by individual employees during the life
of an agreement should not be protected when the union itself could
not strike. The same reasons which would make union-called strikes
unprotected apply to action by individual employees. If the union is
precluded from striking by the no-strike clause, all forms of pressure
should be unprotected." 5 The employer typically makes concessions in
order to obtain the assurance of industrial peace, contained in the
no-strike clause. It would be fairly easy to subvert the meaning of
this assurance and to upset the employer's reasonable expectations,
if the union could, by declaring itself neutral, grant to individual
employees the right to use the very economic pressure which the union
has foresworn. The same reasons which have led the courts to infer a
no-strike pledge because of the existence of a grievance machinery,
would suggest that individuals should not be able to strike over any-
thing which could be settled through the grievance machinery. 06
Similarly the provisions of section 8(d) (4) express the policy that
an employer should not be forced by economic pressure to make addi-
tional concessions with respect to matters covered by an agreement,
during its life.2"' Strikes or other forms of economic pressure by
individual employees seeking a change in the agreement are as de-
structive of the statutory purpose as strikes called by a union and,
accordingly, should be held unprotected." 8
204 The argument for permitting a union to obtain by agreement the ability
to compromise or waive an employee grievance is stated in Cox, Rights Under a
Labor Agreement, 69 H~Av. L. REv. 601, 618-19, 625-27 (1956). This position was
apparently adopted by the Supreme Court. Vaca v. Sipes, supra note 203.
205 Often work stoppages by employees acting independently of the union will
be specifically covered and made unprotected by the no-strike clause.
206 See Harnischfeger Corp. v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1953).
2 07 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), § 8(d) (4), 61 Stat.
143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (4) (1964).
208 If the employees do not engage in a strike but use harassing tactics or if
they limit their picketing to non-working hours, the applicable principles are never-
theless the same. The employer is being economically injured by his own employees
contrary to the policy of § 8(d) (4) and the collective bargaining agreement.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Although section 7 grants employees the right to utilize eco-
nomic pressure for certain broadly stated purposes, the employer,
acting to protect his economic interests, is often in a position to make
the exercise of this right costly for the participants. The question of
an employer's ability to respond to concerted activity has been con-
fused by recent Supreme Court opinions indicating that employer
response to such activity does not violate the NLRA, unless the em-
ployer is motivated by the desire to punish the employees for exercising
their rights. These statements emphasizing motive are inconsistent
with earlier opinions and represent an unsound approach to the enforce-
ment of the act. It should be for the Board and the courts, rather than
the employer, to determine whether his economic interests justify
making economic pressure costly for those who engage in it.
It is settled, however, that an employer may permanently replace
economic strikers. If strikers are told that they may not return to
work before a replacement is hired, they are discharged in violation of
sections 8(a) (1) and (3). The distinction between discharge and re-
placement works fairly well in the context of an economic strike. Its
application is more confused with respect to employees who refuse to
cross picket lines. The Board holds that such refusals are protected, but
also holds that an employer may, without violating the act, notify the
employee that he is discharged before a replacement is hired. However,
the employee is entitled to his job if he offers to return to work before a
replacement has been hired or before the employer has taken action to
eliminate the job. The Eighth Circuit has rejected the Board's con-
clusion that an employee who refuses to cross a picket line may be
entitled to reinstatement once he has been properly notified of his
discharge." 9 The Board's conclusion is more consistent with the concept
of protected activity than is the conclusion of the court.
Courts have sometimes held that economic pressure is not a
legitimate way of achieving a purpose which comes within the concept
of mutual aid or protection. This conclusion has been reached several
times with respect to economic pressure to protest changes in super-
vision. The theory that such changes are a management prerogative
about which employees should not be able to use economic pressure
fails to take into account the fact that such activity almost always occurs
in unorganized plants. The employee's action in such a case should not
be treated as an attempt to use economic pressure in support of a
bargaining demand. Such action is much more likely to constitute
2109 NLRB v. L. G. Everist, Inc., 334 F.2d" 312 (8th Cir. 1964).
19671
1250 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.115:1195
a dramatic expression of general displeasure with working conditions
and, as such, it should be held protected. On the other hand, economic
pressure should generally be unprotected when it is in support of a
demand made by the employees against someone other than their
employer. In such cases, the employees' interests can be served in
other ways and there is little reason to subject the employer to
economic harassment.
The Board's conclusion that refusal to cross a picket line is pro-
tected activity has not been adequately explained, but it is a reasonable
one. Part of the policy of the Wagner Act was to permit em-
ployees to make common cause with employees of other employers.
Although this policy has largely been overshadowed by the policy
against the spread of industrial disputes, the new policy was not
intended to and should not apply to refusals to cross picket lines. The
Board holds that for the refusal to be protected, the picket line must
be lawful. This conclusion is unfortunate because it increases the
power of an employer to discharge an employee on the basis of circum-
stances having no real relevance to their own interests or conduct.
The Supreme Court has held certain forms of economic pressure
unprotected, including intermittent work stoppages and public attacks
on the employer's product. These conclusions should now be re-
evaluated in light of the employer's increased ability to use economic
pressure and the court's seeming rejection, in unfair labor practice cases,
of the process of picking and choosing among types of economic pres-
sure. The use of such tactics during bargaining negotiations does not
represent a serious threat to industrial stability nor is it unfair to the
employer, since his ability to respond has been increased. Such tactics
are not likely to be used at other times because unorganized employees
rarely use sophisticated forms of economic pressure and because strikes
during the term of an agreement are generally unprotected.
Once a union is recognized, separate bargaining by individual
employees is contrary to the scheme of exclusive representation con-
templated by the act. However, in certain circumstances, independent
bargaining pressure in support of the union should be held protected.
Once an agreement is signed, economic pressure either by the union or
by the individual employees is generally and properly held unprotected.
